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1. Preliminary Remarks
THE origin of this paper can be traced back to two different interests- Buddhist thought and animal behaviour. Some years ago I discovered 
with great joy that my childhood fascination for animals can be a serious 
enterprise. Tempered with meticulous observation and careful interpreta­
tion, it can become the honourable science of animal behaviour or ethology. 
This, in turn, can and should be the foundation of any attempt to formulate a 
sound philosophical anthropology. Until about a year ago, however, I still 
could not find a place for my renewed interest in animal behaviour in rela­
tion to my main field of research, i.e. Buddhist studies. Once too often I felt 
guilty for betraying the study of the Noble Path and showing instead child­
ish enthusiasm for anything concerning animal behaviour, from serious sci­
entific studies to TV documentaries. The chance to find a connection 
between the two fields arose in 1998 when Professor Schmithausen kindly 
invited me to contribute to the panel on “The Value of Nature in Buddhism” 
to be held at the 12th conference of the International Association of 
Buddhist Studies in Lausanne. After some hesitation, I chose to write on ani­
mals in Pali literature, without having, however, surveyed the topic suffi­
ciently at that time. My fear in the initial stage of the project was that the 
study was not going to yield enough relevant results. Now I strongly feel that 
my choice has proved to be a very fruitful path for understanding some basic 
assumptions of Buddhist philosophy, and this goes far beyond a personal
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interest in animal behaviour. A word of caution is, however, imperative: this 
study is far from being complete and, furthermore, I can hardly claim that I 
have attained sufficient expertise in Buddhist studies, let alone ethology. I 
hope, however, that this modest contribution will at least succeed in raising 
some questions not only concerning the place of animals in the Tipitaka1 but 
also regarding the more fundamental problem of how Buddhism conceives 
and conveys reality.
1 The study focuses on the canonical and paracanonical texts of the Pali Tipitaka with 
occasional references to the commentarial literature (the Atthakathas and Tikis') and 
Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga. References to Pali texts are based on the PTS editions, with 
the exception of the Visuddhimagga, for which I have also consulted Eugene Clark Warren, 
ed., Dharamananda Kosambi, revised, Visuddhimagga o f Buddhaghosacariya (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1989) (When necessary, I note pages in both the PTS ed. and Warren ed. 
of the Visuddhimagga). The system of abbreviations and reference follows A Critical Pali 
Dictionary (hereafter CPD) (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 
begun in 1924) and Oskar von Hmiiber, A Handbook o f Pali Literature (New Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1997). Sn, Th, Thi, and Dhp are quoted by verse number, 
which is often followed by the page number in parentheses. E.g. Dhp 320 (p. 90) refers to 
verse 320 found on page 90. The references to the Taisho edition of the Chinese Tripitaka 
(abbreviated as T) follow the usual citation conventions.
2 Animals actually play such a role in fables all over the world. In her Encyclopedia o f
Fable (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1999), Mary Ellen Snodgrass writes: “From early times, 
the comparison of humans to animals has been the life’s blood of witty, comic, and dis­
turbingly accurate morality tales known as fables . . (p. XIII). Comparison of human beings
to animals are “the life’s blood” not only of the Buddhist genre of fables, allegories, and para­
bles but also of many passages of (supposedly) pure doctrinal discourse.
Reading Pali literature in quest of philosophical truths, which admittedly 
is the commonest approach, will somehow underplay the significance and 
role of the animals in the holy texts. Once the focus is changed to animals 
themselves, one realises how diverse and important their presence is. 
Portrayed as denizens of natural surroundings, gentle beings, ferocious crea­
tures, objects of meditative friendliness and compassion, images of inner 
hopes, fears, and passions, characters of parables, fables, and allegories, ani­
mals are ubiquitous in the Canon. Without them, the sacred scriptures would 
look totally different, bereft of vitality and, in many case, of the very possi­
bility of developing their peculiar doctrinal discourse.2 We have to deal here 
with a unique blend of metaphorical and literal styles whose systematic 
investigation from a stylistic and semiotic perspective remains a strong 
desideratum both for Buddhism and aesthetics. This will reveal not only the
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structure and typology of the sacred texts but also some fundamental 
assumptions governing Buddhist epistemology.3
3 Attempts to explore Christian texts from a semiotic perspective have already been 
undertaken. Cf., for instance, Daniel Patte, ed., Semiology and Parables: Exploration o f the 
Possibilities Offered by Structuralism for Exegesis (Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1976), 
which besides dealing with a number of theoretical models and problems concerning semiol­
ogy in general and parables in particular, analyses Biblical parables like the Unjust Judge, the 
Prodigal Son, etc. A call for the usage of semiotic methods to analyse Buddhist literature has 
also been expressed by Linnart Mall, “Buddhist Studies and Semiotics” (Paper presented at 
the 35th International Congress of Asian and African Studies, Budapest, 7-12 July 1997).
4 “Zoemes, animals given semantic functions.” Claude Levi-Strauss, The Jealous Potter, 
Benedicte Chorier trans. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988, 97). The 
usage of the term, however, does not mean that I adopt here (or elsewhere!) Levi-Strauss’s 
methodology.
5 In my discussion of animal images as well as in many other philosophical assumptions 
underlying my views on animals, I have been strongly influenced by Mary Midgley, Beast 
and Man: The Roots o f Human Nature, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) 
(cf. especially ch. 2).
6 This does not mean that fables and tales do not occur in other parts of the Canon. We 
find, for instance, in Vin II 161-2 the story of a partridge, a monkey and a bull-elephant, 
which undertook and observed the five precepts (panca sila). I shall discuss a different aspect 
of this tale in Section 2. Cf. James McDermott, “Animals and Humans in Early Buddhism”, 
Indo-Iranian Journal 32, 269-70.
My main concern here is, however, not such a theoretical exploration. I 
started with the intention to find and discuss passages in the Tipitaka deal­
ing primarily with animal behaviour. As it soon became apparent, such 
instances are so limited that any “ethological” exploration ends up in exam­
ining not only animal behaviour proper but also Buddhist images and sym­
bols of animals. It must be emphasised from the very beginning that there is 
not such a thing as “Buddhist ethology,” and observations concerning ani­
mal behaviour, simple or complex, are mainly employed as doctrinal meta­
phors. Despite their overwhelming presence, animals as animals are, 
avowedly, not the major concern in the Buddhist authors. It is mainly ani­
mals as symbols, or “zoemes” to use Levi-Strauss’s terminology,4 that have 
attracted the attention of the Buddhist authors and redactors. In order to fil­
ter “ethological” observations from Buddhist texts, one has to examine also 
the image of particular animals.5 I have, nevertheless, made a distinction 
between the apparently deliberate usage of animals as characters in parables 
and fairy tales, mainly occurring in the Jataka and similar collections of sto­
ries,6 and the zoemes spread throughout the Canon which seem to convey a
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genuine Buddhist conception (or misconception) regarding animals. In other 
words, I have started from the following working hypothesis: Buddhist 
authors or redactors were, I believe, aware of the fact that real animals, at 
least in our age, do not actually think, speak, and act like many of the Jataka 
animal characters.7 In this respect they seem to share a view similar with our
7 Admittedly, we have to deal here with at least two delicate points:
First, it is well-known that much of the Jataka literature is not purely Buddhist in origin. 
Lambert Schmithausen and Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi (“Tier und Menschen im 
Buddhismus,” in Paul Munch and Rainer Waltz, Tier und Menschen: Geschichte und 
Aktualitat eines Prekaren Verhaltnisses [Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1998], 214 ) 
describe them as “im Kern grossenenteils vorbuddhistische.” Cf. von Hiniiber, A Handbook 
o f Pali Literature, 56-8, Hajime Nakamura, Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical 
Notes (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1987; orig. publ. 1980), 46-8, etc. However, 
though much of the narrative substance of the Jataka may be non-Buddhist in origin, its 
inclusion in the Canon of many schools proves that their moral conclusions were deemed 
compatible with the Buddhist doctrine. It is hard to ascertain whether the Buddhist authors or 
redactors considered all narrative elements of the stories to be absolutely authentic. Many 
other parts of the Canon, however, present a different view on animals. In these passages ani­
mals do not talk or behave like humans. Although not completely verifiable, it is nevertheless 
more likely to assume that the Buddhist redactors of the fables and fairy tales were aware that 
animals in these narratives did not behave in the same way as the true animals they were 
familiar with. The different behavioural paradigm of the fable animals must have been, first 
and foremost, a useful form of symbolism meant to transmit Buddhist doctrines.
Second, we may have deal here with a very old mythical stratum which invests animals 
with the possibility to speak like humans. This might raise some serious problems of com­
patibility with the interpretation above. Andre Bareau and Jaques May (“Chikusho in
Hobogirin, 4th Fascicle, 310, 313) mention the Buddhist belief that at the beginning of the 
evolution-aeon (vivarta-kalpa $c®J) all animals spoke the sacred language, i.e. Sanskrit, and 
they have lost this capacity as a result of the gradual moral corruption of the living beings. 
Since the Jatakas deal with the Bodhisatta’s previous lives in the remote past, one could 
assume that the redactors may have had in mind a different epoch when animals could speak. 
Although this is a possible logical conclusion within the Buddhist doctrinal system, I am not 
aware of any interpretation like this overtly expressed in Pali texts. The relevant texts, quot­
ed by Bareau and May, are the Mahdvibhasa, the *Sarvastivadavinaya-vibhasa, and the 
Abhidharmanydydnusdra-sastra. Despite numerous doctrinal similarities between the 
Sarvastivadins and Theravadins, the two schools represent, nevertheless, different traditions. 
Even if it was believed that animals could talk like humans in earlier periods, the Buddhist 
authors and redactors presumably knew, however, that they cannot do it anymore nowadays.
For all these reasons, I assume that it is more appropriate to treat the animal behaviour in 
the Buddhist fables and fairy tales as a deliberate usage of symbolism and differentiate it form 
other passages where it appears to reflect true conceptions related to animals. We have, of 
course, border cases where the demarcation line is difficult to draw. Sometimes we have to
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modem outlook on animals. Despite the extremely frequent occurrence of 
animals in the Jataka? my reference to this genre will, therefore, be limited 
mainly to some cases which do not treat animals as human-behaving char­
acters of fables or seem to reflect a realistic approach towards environment. 
The focus of my investigation will be on those conceptions and images, 
some of them problematic from a modem scientific viewpoint, some o f them 
very appropriate observations, which appear to express genuine views on 
animal behaviour, views perhaps shared by large segments of the traditional 
Buddhist community.
Before embarking upon our exploration of animal behaviour and images 
in the Pali Canon, we must clarify the basic early Buddhist9 attitudes 
towards animals. It is customary to start such a discussion with pointing out 
the paramount importance of friendliness (metta) and compassion (karuna). 
From King Sivi10 to passages describing animals gathering round the ascetic
deal with different paradigms inside the same textual unit. The story of the partridge, monkey 
and elephant which observe the five precepts (Vin II 160-1) contains, on one hand, a sym­
bolical component in which animals are made to behave exactly like humans and, on the other 
hand, a very accurate ecological observation that bird droppings may contain seeds which 
will eventually grow into trees (see Section 2 below). It is somehow arbitrary to split such 
texts, but we should not forget that “a text represents the result of the coexistence of many 
codes (or, at least, of many subcodes)” (Umberto Eco, A Theory o f Semiotics [Bloomington: 
Indiana Univ. Press, 1976], 57). For the sake of analysis, I think we can isolate and treat sep­
arately different subcodes as long as we make clear our objectives and methodology. My cri­
terion will be here modem ethological knowledge and Buddhist textual codes will be 
compared with this. We should not forget, however, that the text was and is a single unit and 
such divisions are basically theoretical attempts to understand this unique complexity.
8 A recent (though far from complete) study on animals in the Jataka has been published 
by Christopher Key Chapple, “Animals and Environment in the Buddhist Birth Stories,” in 
Mary Evelyn Tucker and Duncan Ryuken Williams, eds., Buddhism and Ecology 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, Harvard University Center for the Study of World 
Religions, 1997), 131-148.
9 I use here the term “early Buddhism” in a very wide sense starting with the origins and 
stretching into the first centuries of the Common Era. When applied to the Theravadin scrip­
tural tradition, it begins with the earliest oral transmision and ends with the (more or less) 
final redaction of the canonical and para-canonical Pali texts.
10 Ja, No. 499; for other occurrences in Buddhist literature, cf. Etienne Lamotte, trans., Le
traite de la grande vertu de sagesse, Tome 1 (Louvain: Insitut Orientaliste Louvain-la-Neuve 
Lamotte, 1944), p. 255, n. 1; W.H.D. Rouse, trans., E.B. Cowell, ed., The Jataka or Stories 
o f the Buddha's Former Births, vol. 4 (Oxford: PTS, 1995; orig. publ. 1895), p. 250, n. 1; 
Akanuma Chizen Indo bukkyo koyii meishi jiten (Kyoto:
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who pervades all quarters of the Universe with metta (see below), friendli­
ness and compassion, with their universal scope, played an undeniable role 
in fostering a lot more sympathy towards living beings than the traditional 
Western attitude. There is not such a thing as a single unitary Western view 
on animals, but its Christian core has aptly been described by Albin 
Michelin as: “If they [i.e. animals] speak, baptise them! If they don’t speak, 
cook them!”11 We should not, however, over-emphasise the role of metta 
and karuna at the expense of other equally important attitudes. No matter 
how impressive friendliness and non-violence may be, reality is more com­
plex and a fair treatment of Buddhism should encompass all its facets. It is 
undeniable that metta/maitri is a central concept of Buddhist morality and 
spirituality, and its practice has had far-reaching consequences for the 
monastic and lay community all throughout Asia. But even when duly 
acknowledging the role played by friendliness and compassion, we should 
not forget that metta/maitri, as pointed out by Schmithausen, is not only a 
purely spiritual practice but also a method of self-protection.12
In “Tier und Menschen im Buddhismus,” the most detailed and remark­
able study on animals and humans in Buddhism so far, Schmithausen and
Hozokan, 1931), s.v. Sivi. For more recent studies, which also contain complete bibliograph­
ical details, see Dieter Schlingloff, Ajanta Paintings (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1987), 
86-92, and Marion Meisig, Konig Sibi und die Taube (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1995). I am 
indebted to Professor Schmithausen for these last two references.
11 Quoted after Boris Cyrulnik, “Le bapteme ou la casserole” (Le Nouvel Observateur 
4-10 Juin 1998), 11. As all generalisations, however, this does not hold true for all aspects of 
the Western and Christian attitude towards nature in general and animals in particular, which 
is far from being a monolithic phenomenon. For detailed discussions, see Lynn White, “The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” (1967) in Louis P. Pojman, Environmental Ethics: 
Readings in Theory and Application (Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1994), 8-14; 
Patrick Dobel, “The Judeo-Christian Stewardship toward Nature” (1977) in Pojman, 
Environmental Ethics, 20-23; Pojman, ibid., 24; Paul Munch and Rainer Walz, eds., Tier und 
Menschen: Geschichte und Aktualitat eines prekaren Verhaltnisses\ and Arien Mack, ed., 
Humans and Other Animals (Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1999).
12 Lambert Schmithausen, Maitrl and Magic: Aspects o f the Buddhist Attitude Toward the 
Dangerous in Nature (Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
1997), 35-44. The ethical and spiritual implications of metta/maitri and the other three infini­
tudes (appamana/apramana) are also the subject of an excellent historico-philological inves­
tigation in Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi, Wohlwollen, Mitleid, Freude und Gleichmut: Eine 
ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung der vier apramanas in der buddhistischen Ethik und 
Spiritualitat von den Anfdngen bis hin zum frilhen Yogacara (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 
1999).
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Maithrimurthi distinguish a number of evaluations of the animal existence.13 
First, we have a negative evaluation of the animal existence which is count­
ed amongst the bad forms of re-incamation (duggati/durgati).14 The sur­
vival of the fittest makes the animal world far more uncomfortable and full 
of affliction when compared to the human condition. “Monks, there is 
devouring one another there and feeding on the weak” (MN III 169).15 
Animals are continuously threatened by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, etc. Many 
species of animals are considered to fall into promiscuity and incestuous 
relations (DN III 72; AN I 51; It 36).16 Compared to humans, they are in an 
inferior position because they cannot develop liberating insight and progress 
along the Buddhist Path.17 Second, we have a different attitude, usually 
associated with the less doctrinal and essentially popular literature repre­
sented by the Jdtaka, which views animals with more sympathy, and pre­
sents their world as acceptable, especially when not intruded upon by human 
beings. Third, we have a group of texts chiefly related to the Buddhist
13 Schmithausen and Maithrimurthi, “Tier und Menschen im Buddhismus,” 179-224; esp. 
208-16.
14 The idea of rebirth as an animal, considered a bad form of reincarnation, appears in some 
early Upanisads as well. Most notably, it is mentioned as “a third possibility” different from 
the two paths theory of the Chandogya-upanisad and the Brhaddranyaka-upanisad. See 
Lambert Schmithausen, “Man, animals and plants in the rebirth passages of the Early 
Upanisads,” The Journal o f  the Royal Asiatic Society o f Sri Lanka 38 (1995), 141-162.
15 I. B. Homer, trans., The Collection o f  the Middle Length Sayings (Oxford: PTS, 
1954-1959), vol. 3,215.
16 Cf. Schmithausen and Maithrimurthi, “Tier und Menschen,” 211, n. 251. The miscon­
ception that incest is promiscuously widespread in the animal world has a long history in 
many cultures, and Buddhism seems to share it. The phenomenon happens, however, very 
seldom in reality. The basic ethological reason is that breeding of close relatives causes 
reduced biological fitness, scientifically known as inbreeding depression (Richard Maier, 
Comparative Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary and Ecological Approach [Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon, 1998], 34). Different species have different strategies to avoid this extremely dan­
gerous situation. Inbreeding tends to become more frequent with endangered species as well 
as domestic animals when their human breeders do not undertake efficient prevention mea­
sures. In both cases, however, inbreeding is not something natural. It happens simply because 
the number of choices an animal can make is extremely reduced and avoidance strategies 
cannot work efficiently. If we can speak of a “moral” aspect of such incestuous relations, the 
ultimate responsibility should rest with humans who encroach upon the natural behaviour and 
habitat of animals.
17 Let us note in this respect that the Vinaya (Vin V 222; Vin I 86) forbids the ordination of 
animals into the monastic order (cf. McDermott, “Animals and Humans in Early Buddhism,” 
270).
85
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H IS T  X X X II, 2
ascetics. These scriptures stress metta and the possibility to bring peaceful 
and harmonious relations with animals. Nature can even acquire soteric val­
ues.18 This ascetic trend also contains an aesthetic component: the recluse 
can enjoy the beauty of nature, animals included. “Aesthetic” should be 
construed here as a value closely associated with the spiritual cultivation of 
the meditating monk. Roughly speaking, the second and third groups o f texts 
usually reflect a more positive attitude towards animals.
18 This type of literature and the soteric aspects of Nature have been explored in detail by 
Lambert Schmithausen, “Soteric Aspects of Nature in Buddhism” (Lecture delivered at Otani 
University, Kyoto, 2 March 1999).
19 A lot has been written on the subject. Among individual contributions, suffice it to men­
tion here Lambert Schmithausen’s contributions which offer the most objective treatment of 
the subject and a full coverage of the traditional (mainly Indian) and modem sources: 
Buddhism and Nature (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991); 
“Buddhism and Environmental Ethics: Some Reflections” in Studies in Buddhology, 
Philosophy & Buddhist Scriptural Language Presented by Leading Scholars Worldwide 
(Thailand: Dahmmakaya Foundation, 1994); “Man, Animals and Plants in the Rebirth 
Passages of the Early Upanisads” (1995, see above); “Buddhism and Ecological 
Responsibility,” in Lawerence Surendra, Klaus Schindler, and Prasanna Ramaswamy, eds., 
The Stories They Tell: A Dialogue among Philosophers, Scientists, and Environmentalists 
(Madras: Earthworm Books, 1996); “The Early Buddhist Tradition and Ecological Ethics,” 
The Journal o f Buddhist Ethics 4 (1997), 1-74; Maitrl and Magic (1997, see above); “Tier 
und Menschen in Buddhismus” (1998, see above); “Buddhism and Nature Ethics: Some 
Remarks” (Lecture delivered at the Symposium “Nature Understanding and Buddhism” 
organised by Waseda University and Toho Gakkai, Tokyo, 30 January 1999); and “Soteric 
Aspects of Nature in Buddhism” (1999, see above). Useful studies are also found in the col­
lections edited by Martine Batchelor and Kerry Brown, eds., Buddhism and Ecology (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1994) as well as by Tucker and Williams, eds., Buddhism 
and Ecology (1997, see above), the latter also containing an extensive bibliography on 
Buddhism and ecology.
More will be said about the philosophical premises of the Buddhist views 
on reality and animals in the final section of this paper.
2. Animals and (Proto-)Environmentalist Concerns
It is debatable whether we can speak about Buddhist environmental ethics in 
the modem sense of the word.19 Are animals seen as part of a complex 
ecosystem? There are Buddhist texts which speak of complex relations 
between living beings, and this can be said to anticipate dimly our under­
standing of an ecosystem. Trying to see here too much, however, will prove 
nothing but a highly developed ability of interpreting ancient texts in terms 
of modem concerns and rhetoric. This may satisfy the requirements of a
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Green activist or an Eco-Buddhist in search of orthodox origins for his inter­
ests, but it will hardly qualify one as a prudent historian. While I may quite 
often agree with many of the concrete actions of environment-caring 
activists, Buddhists or not, my viewpoint here is that of philological and his­
torical studies. Though complete objectivity remains a utopian requirement, 
I shall try to be as fair as possible and see what the texts have to say. This 
does not mean a lack of personal stance but rather a clear distinction 
between the message of the texts and my own views.
As we shall see below, Buddhist scriptures quite often employ animals, 
made to impersonate a whole range of human virtues and vices, in order to 
draw moral conclusions. Such texts, however, tend to appear “ecological” to 
the modem reader who lives in a different epistemic paradigm as well as in 
a substantially changed environment whose massive destruction under­
standably requires new perspectives. O f course, we could use the term 
“environment” in a very broad sense and speak of a “proto-environmental­
ist concern.” This is basically how I use the word here. I frankly acknowl­
edge, however, that the terminology belongs more to the modem 
environmentalist rhetoric than to the traditional Buddhist outlook.
Usually, the Pali Canon treats animals in isolation or in very simple, obvi­
ous relations with other animals. We have, nevertheless, some passages 
where animals are depicted in more complex relations with the environment. 
We also find some “proto-scientific” insights into concepts like the habitat. 
Let us discuss a few examples here.
The Vyaggha-jataka (Jataka No. 272, Ja II 356-8) tells us the following 
story. The Bodhisatta was a tree-spirit living in forest where a lion and a 
tiger left the remains of their prey on the spot filling the forest with a decay­
ing smell. Despite the Bodhisatta’s wise advice, another tree-spirit, who 
could not stand the stench any longer, drove away the lion and the tiger. 
Then humans, no longer afraid of the ferocious beasts, came in and cut down 
all the wood for cultivation. Especially to the modem reader, the story 
sounds very familiar. It is true that it contains accurate observations con­
cerning the role of predators in keeping the integrity and balance o f the 
ecosystem. The Buddhist authors of the tale, however, regard it first and 
foremost as a moral lesson: though we might not realise it, a friend’s life 
might increase our own peace and we should accept it exactly as it is.20
In the Vinaya (Vin II 161-2) we read the tale of a partridge, monkey, and
20 The Buddha identifies the characters as follows: Kokalika was the foolish tree-spirit,
87
THE EA STER N  B U D D H IST X X X II, 2
a bull-elephant who want to know which is the eldest of them. Each tells its 
earliest memory concerning a large banyan tree growing near the place 
where they live. It turns out that the partridge is the eldest, because it remem­
bers that a long time ago it ate the fruit of another banyan and then relieved 
itself in the open space where the banyan tree now grows. From this, the par­
tridge adds, the present banyan tree has grown out. It is a very accurate 
observation concerning the fact that bird droppings can contain fruit seed 
and play an important role in the ecosystem.
We find another interesting “proto-ecological” insight in the simile o f the 
six animals which are caught by a man and tied together with the same rope 
(SN IV 198-200). If  that man were to let them go away,
. . . those six animals of diverse range and diverse pasturage 
would struggle to be off, each one to his own range and pasture. 
The snake would struggle, thinking: I’ll enter the anthill. The 
crocodile: I ’ll enter the water. The bird: I’ll mount into the air. The 
dog: I ’ll enter the village. The jackal would think: I ’ll go the char­
nel-field. The monkey would think: I ’ll be off to the forest.21
Well, to start with, the “experiment,” if it was ever carried out at all, 
might be slightly controversial from the viewpoint of modem scientific 
ethics. I can hardly imagine the monkey, for instance, being in a mood to 
appreciate the thrilling experience of being tied next to a crocodile and a 
snake. But this is just a matter of detail! The point here is that the text m en­
tions the concept of “range” (visaya) or what we would today call a habitat, 
i.e. “a place where a species can be found,”22 with the “pasturage” 
(gocara)23 or foraging place as its main component. The Pali text, however, 
is not concerned here with ecological details. The description above serves
Sariputta the lion, Moggallana the tiger , and he himself was the wise spirit. The story is also 
discussed by Chapple, “Animals and Environment in the Buddhist Birth Stories” (pp. 
141-42), who stresses too much, I believe, its environmentalist moral. Chapple (ibid., pp. 
140-1) also gives two other examples of Jataka “environmental tales” (my term), but these 
are, to my mind, even less concerned with such problems. A large dose of modem rhetorico- 
hermeneutical effort would be needed to make them acquire truly environmentalist conclu­
sions.
21 F.L. Woodward, trans., The Book o f the Kindred Sayings (London: PTS, 1927), part 4, 
p. 131.
22 Eugene P. Odum, Ecology: A Bridge between Science and Society (Sunderland: Sinauer 
Associates, Inc. Publishers, 1997), 55.
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as simile for the six senses and their objects.
The Buddhist “ecological” sense is not, however, infallible. The Vinaya 
forbids monks to wear sandals decorated with lion-skins, tiger-skins, pan­
ther-skins, black deer-skins, otter-skins, cat-skins, squirrel-skins, and owl­
skins (Vin I 186). It equally prohibits the use of hides of lions, tigers, 
panthers, and cows for couches (Vin I 192-3). The main reason for these 
interdictions appear to be the fear that monks would be judged by lay fol­
lowers as enjoying the pleasures of senses like householders. Whatever their 
motivation might be, these rules are bound to play a salutary effect on the 
life of these animals and, in the long run, on the conservation o f these 
species. There are, nevertheless, passages which show an utter lack o f con­
sideration for animal life. The Slhanada-vagga in the Navaka-nipata finds 
nothing objectionable about a generous gift given by the Buddha in a former 
life which contains, among many other precious items, eighty-four thousand 
chariots spread with lion-skins, tiger-skins, and leopard-skins (AN IV 393). 
Among the rich possessions of King Mahasudassana we find eighty-four 
thousand chariots with coverings of hides of lions, tigers, and leopards (DN 
II 187). Believe it or not, this is found in a passage immediately following a 
detailed description of the King’s practice of the four jhanas and the four 
brahma-viharas. O f course, we are long before the age of the Washington 
Convention and the IUCN (International Union for Conservation o f Nature 
and Natural Resources) Red List o f  Threatened Animals, but I, for one, feel 
that such a non-critical inclusion of a hyperbolic number of animal skins 
amongst acceptable gifts and possessions may indirectly condone indiscrim­
inate hunting.
We should also include in this section on animals and environment the 
magnificent descriptions of jungles teeming with wild life (e.g., Ap I 15-17; 
Ja V 416). They seem to be mainly associated with the ascetic literature as 
well as texts of popular origin. Such passages usually present a positive 
image of nature and animals. Future studies exactly identifying the species 
described and giving accurate statistical data might prove an important tool 
not only for Buddhist scholars but also for biologists. Such texts undoubted-
23 Gocara is used not only for cattle pasture but also for the food and foraging area of other 
animals, including predators like the lion (cf. T.W Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., The 
Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary (London: Pali Text Society, 1986; orig. publ. 
1921-1925) (hereafter, PTS Dictionary), s.v. gocara.
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ly contain precious information on many extinct or endangered species in 
South Asia.24
24 It is interesting to note here that in the SAz er yu jing + —jggg, a short Sravakayana sutra 
preserved only in Chinese translation, we are told the exact number of species in Jambudvipa: 
“6400 species of fishes, 4500 species of birds, and 2400 species of beasts [i.e. ? mammals]” 
(T4.147bl5-17) (Bareau and May, “Chikusho,” 312). I have no figures for fish and mam­
mals, but the present number of bird species in South Asia is estimated between 2000 
(Francis Robinson, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia o f India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989], 26) and 
1300 (Richard Grimmet, Carol Inskipp, and Tom Inskipp, A Guide to the Birds o f India, 
Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 
1999]). It is hard to know how the figures given in the above sutra had been arrived at. Are 
they arbitrary or symbolic? Do they rely on any observation and counting? The latter possi­
bility is quite debatable, especially when we think that the modem definition of species and 
the remotely corresponding traditional understanding of the term are often quite different. If 
we accept, however, the figure as, at least, vaguely reliable, it would prove that the number of 
bird species on the Indian sub-continent has been drastically reduced during the past two 
thousand years.
25 For a statistical list of animals occurring in the Jataka tales, see Chapple, “Animals and 
Environment in the Buddhist Birth Stories,” 145-6.
26 Abhidhanappadlpika and Ekakkharakosa [Pali Dictionary] [With Sanskrit Hindi 
Translation), Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. (Varanasi: Bauddhabharati, 1981). Wilhelm
3. Conceptions and Misconceptions Concerning Animal Behaviour
This section will focus on the behaviour and image of five representative 
and frequently featured animals in the Pali Canon2 5 : the elephant, deer, 
monkey, lion, and jackal. Before doing this, a few words on zoological accu­
racy are needed. The precise identification of animals in ancient texts is not 
always an easy matter. We can be more or less sure that the large number of 
words naming the “elephant” (see below) in the Pali language refer to the 
Elephas maximus, but things become more complicated with animals like 
the “deer” or the “monkey.” O f course, for general purposes, these terms 
should be appropriate enough, but if we are keen to be scientifically accu­
rate, we will discover that we have few clues as to the exact species men­
tioned in our Pali texts. Commentarial literature may be more detailed but, 
as far as my limited experience of working with it allows me to conclude, 
neither the Atthakathas nor the Tlkas contain sufficient information needed 
for a zoologically acceptable identification. The traditional Pali lexicon 
Abhidhanappadlpika 26 is helpful in that it gives many synonyms and words
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believed to represent sub-categories of animal names in the Tipitaka, but the 
exact interpretation of each of them is problematic and this eventually does 
not take us much further. With this in mind, let us survey the images and pat­
terns of behaviour of the animals I have chosen.
3.1. The Elephant
What is variously called in Pali kunjara, naga, gaja, matanga, vdrana, 
hatthin, hatthi-naga represents in all probability one species: the Asiatic or 
Indian elephant (Elephas maximus). Its various patterns of behaviour as well 
as the existence of tamed elephants for more than three thousand years in 
India27 have led to ambivalent images in the Buddhist Canon. On the whole, 
Pali texts, at least, seem to present a rather favourable image of the elephant, 
especially the tamed one. Ch. 23 of the Dhammapada (Dhp 320-333, pp. 
90-93), actually entitled “The Elephant” fNagavaggaf encapsulates the 
basic images of the animal in the Tipitaka. The tamed elephant, especially 
the one enduring arrows in battle, is a symbol of the man who can control his 
passions (Dhp 320-323, p. 90), while the furious elephant in rut28 is com-
Geiger, Pali Literature and Language, B. Ghosh, trans. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal 
Publishers, 1996; Orig. publ. in German, 1916), 56, places the date of this lexicon, tradition­
ally ascribed to Moggallana, towards the end of the 12th century.
27 The large scale use of elephants in warfare, with dramatic effects for the socio-political 
history of India, starts around 500 BCE (Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, A 
History o f India [London and New York: Routledge, 1990], 10). It seems, however, that the 
elephant was used for military purposes as early as 1100 BCE (R. Sukumar, The Asian 
Elephant: Ecology and Management [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], quot­
ed in Ronald M. Nowak, Walker's Mammals o f the World, 6th ed. [Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1999], 998). It is debatable whether we can use the word 
“domestication” in the elephant’s case. Nowak, the world-wide known authority on mam­
mals, uses it (Walker’s Mammals of the World, 997), but authors of the entry on the “ele­
phant” in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Inc., 1994) make it clear why they are reluctant to employ the term: “Because an elephant 
must be at least 20 years old to do complex tasks, the species has never been truly domesti­
cated; rather, young adults are captured wild and trained with the help of tame individuals.” 
(vol. 4, p. 442).
28 Hatthippabhinna (in verse 326) is translated by F. Max Muller, The Dhammapada: A 
Collection o f Verses (Sacred Books of the East, vol. 10; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988; 
orig. publ., 1881), 79, as “furious elephant.” Radhakrishnan (in Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan 
and Charles A. Moore, eds., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy [Princeton: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1957], 317) translates “elephant in rut.” Nakamura Hajime TTf A (trans., Budda no
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pared to the mind which wanders as it pleases (Dhp 324-326, p. 91). On the 
other hand, the latter half of the chapter makes the elephant the symbol of 
solitude (Dhp 329, p. 92) and of a care-free (appossukka) state (Dhp 330, p. 
93).29
Ethologically, the observation concerning the tamed elephant as opposed 
to the furious elephant30 in rut is correct, although the image of the latter 
used as symbol of the uncontrolled mind is obviously anthropocentric. 
Could elephants read such texts, they would probably find them not exactly 
flattering. (Note that this remark is equally based on human ideals: in order 
to achieve their “overall efficiency in satisfying fitness requirements”31 ele­
phants do not need to bother themselves with reading.) Similar images are 
found in other texts as well. The Sagathavagga compares a monk who has 
attained perfect calm to a tamed elephant (SN I 141). The Theragatha uses 
the image of the elephant in battle as a model of mindfulness (Th 31, p. 6;
shinri no kotoba, Kankyd no kotoba ©MS® t U ,  SS®® Z. [Tokyo: Iwanami
shoten, 1978], 56) understands it in a similar way: A SET “a mad elephant in rut.”
Tsuji Naoshiro (in Nanden daizokyo the Japanese translation of the Pali
Tipitaka, published in 70 volumes between 1936-1941 under the supervision of Takakusu 
Junjiro [Tokyo: Taisho shinshu daizokyo kankokai] [hereafter, Nanden], vol. 23, p. 68) trans­
lates as [. . . inttfS®  “the elephant flowing [with bitter juice in rut . . .].”
The PTS Dictionary gives a “furious elephant” s.v. hatthin, but explains it as “an elephant in 
rut, mad, furious” s.v. pabhinna. This is also the understanding of the Dhammapadatthakatha 
(IV 24) which glosses hatthipabhinna as mattahatthi (ibid.). It appears the most likely mean­
ing, which also makes good sense from an ethological viewpoint.
29 Appossukka is usually translated here as “with few wishes” (Max Muller, The 
Dhammapada, 80; Radhakrishnan, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, 317; Nakamura, 
Budda no shinri no kotoba, Kankyd no kotoba, 56; Tsuji, Nanden, vol. 23, 68). Nakamura 
understands it as an exhortation for the monk to be with few desires. The other translators 
interpret it as directly qualifying the elephant. To me, an elephant “with few desires” sounds 
too “ascetic.” CPD translates apposukka (s.v.) as “careless, unconcerned, living at ease, inac­
tive.” The commentary glosses the term here as niralaya (cf. CPD', PTS Dictionary, s.v. 
appossukka). This, too, can be taken as meaning either “without an abode” or “without 
attachment.” Both meanings fit in our context, but I think that it refers here to the care-free or 
unconcerned dignity which large bull elephants living in solitude could easily evoke.
30 The furious elephant, especially in rut, could be a real danger. About 100 to 150 people 
are killed annually in India by elephants. Many of these recent conflicts, however, appear to 
be related to the crop raiding of elephants which are increasingly deprived by humans of their 
natural habitat (Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 998).
31 This quotation refers to the optimality theory which is the one of the best theoretical 
models of the evolutionary theory (cf. Maier, Comparative Animal Behavior, 14-5).
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244, p. 31). Monk Vijitasena, bom in a family of elephant-trainers, likens 
restraining the mind to keeping back elephants at the firm small gate 
(dwzJvdre).32 He threatens his wandering mind that he will turn it back under 
control like the trainer who firmly wields his hook and makes the untamed 
elephant turn against its will (Th 355-7, pp. 39-40). In the Therigatha the 
view of a tamed elephant obeying the driver’s orders with docility becomes 
for nun Dantika a powerful hint and motivation for training her own mind 
(Thi 48-50, p. 128).
32 PTS Dictionary (s.v. ani) describes anidvara as “a sort of brush made of four of five 
small pieces of flexible wood.” I wonder whether this description fits in all occurrences. CPD 
(s.v. dni-dvara) translates the term as “a peg-like, i.e. little or low door” and quotes the Th 
Commentary: pakararabaddhassa nagarassa khuddaka-dvaram, which, at least in our con­
text, is more suitable. Though I have no philological proof, I would rather imagine from the 
context a small solid door, not necessarily low, which is attached like a peg to a firm wall or 
fence. Even if broken, it would not easily allow the entrance into the town of many enemies 
or large animals. Let us also note here that the PTS Dictionary also explains ani as “bolt,” 
“stop (at a door)” as well as “secured by a peg, of a door.” The whole compound could mean, 
therefore, a “door with a firm stop” or “a firmly bolted door.” I have followed, however, the 
Th Commentary for whose compiler(s) anidvara must have been a daily reality virtually 
unchanged from the time when Th itself had been composed.
33 Homer, trans., The Collection o f the Middle Length Sayings, vol. 3, pp. 178-9.
34 Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 997.
35 Ap I 17 says that the elephant in rut has three marks, but it gives no further details.
It seems that a number of Buddhist authors and redactors were quite 
familiar with elephant taming. MN III 132-3 gives a detailed account of the 
way elephants are caught and tamed. Interesting to note here that the ele­
phant tamer addresses the wild elephant he has caught “with such words as 
are gentle, pleasing to the ear, affectionate, going to the heart, urbane . . . ,” 
and this makes the elephant “bend his mind to learning.”33 This may seem 
somehow far-fetched, but we should not forget that elephants are usually 
docile when treated well.34 MN I 178 gives interesting details concerning 
elephant tracking. Such fragments represent very important documents for 
the history of the tamed elephant in India. Let us note again, however, that 
the main concern of the Buddhist authors lies in exploring the metaphorical 
potential of the accounts as literary devices for expounding doctrinal points. 
For instance, the MN III 132-3 fragment, quoted above, uses the account of 
elephant taming in order to describe how a Buddhist monk is disciplined by 
the Tathagata.
The mad elephant, whether in heat or not,35 is usually associated with
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threatening images. Mara turns himself into a dreadful elephant to frighten 
the Buddha (obviously with no success!) (SN I 103-4). Devadatta tries to 
kill the Lord by letting loose the fierce elephant Nalagiri, a man-slayer 
(manussaghatakd), which is subdued by the Buddha with thoughts of friend­
liness (mettena cittena) (Vin II 194-5). On the other hand, we also have 
instances when the destructive strength of the animal is used as an image of 
shattering Mara’s armies as the elephant shakes off a reed hut (SN I 156-7; 
Th 256, p. 31; 1147, p. 104).
The solitary elephant equally represents a correct ethological observation. 
The elephant is a gregarious animal and females always live in herds. Bulls, 
on the other hand, usually form all-male groups of about seven individuals 
but sometimes may live alone.36 3789 This latter case seems to have offered the 
Buddhists authors a model of majestic solitude. The image, apparently old 
and associated with ascetic literature, is found in a number of texts (SN I 16; 
Sn 53, p. 9 [commented upon in the Cullaniddesa, pp. 63-4]; Ap I 10; Vin I 
352-3).
36 Nowak, Walker's Mammals o f the World, 996.
37 Homer’s translation (The Collection o f the Middle Length Sayings, vol. 1, p. 282).
38 Cf. ibid., vol. l,p . 282, n. 1.
39 Homer, The Collection o f the Middle Length Sayings, vol. 1, p. 282, n. 1, gives a partial 
translation of the Commentary, but she leaves out the verb kilittha, which is very important in 
that it reflects the author’s (or/and old Singhalese commenators’) view of the elephant as 
being itself engaged in a game.
40 Bathing and wallowing is very important for elephants (cf. Nowak, Walker’s Mammals 
of the World, 999) as for all animals whose body hair covering is scant. It has hygenic func­
tions and is instrumental in lowering the excessive heat as well as protecting the skin.
Besides these images we also find other interesting references concerning 
the behaviour of the animal. MN I 229 speaks about a full-grown elephant 
which plunges into a tank and plays at the game called “merry washing” 
(sanadhovika)^ The Papancasudam (Majjhimanikdydtthakatha, part 2, p. 
272) describes sanadhovika as a game consisting of giving blows to hand­
fuls of hemp with planks followed by washing, drinking, and eating. Most 
likely it was a form of having fun while doing the laundry. The DN 
Commentary is probably right to refer to it as a game of the low class people 
(candala)?* The Papancasudam goes on telling that the king’s elephant 
(ranno ndgo) having seen this game plunges into deep water and sprinkles 
water on all parts of his body. Thus the elephant “played sprinkling [water]” 
(khipanto ldlittha)?9 This probably describes the way an elephant bathes,40
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but it is not excluded that it also refers to a form of play. Recent research 
shows that, despite our earlier preconceptions, many adult animals do actu­
ally engage in playing.41
Vin II 201 and SN II 269 describe an interesting aspect of the elephant’s 
foraging behaviour. Bull elephants plunge into a pool, tug out lotus fibres 
and stalks with their trunks, wash them carefully and eat them without 
mud.4 2 1 am not aware of any ethological report concerning such a complex 
process of foraging, but, on the whole, it seems very plausible. Elephants do 
eat roots, and the trunk is used like a hand to pull up long grasses and insert 
them into the mouth.43
There are, however, instances of debatable “ethological” observations, 
actually challenged by the post-canonical tradition itself. SN III 85 says that 
when hearing the lion’s roar, the royal elephants, “tethered with stout leath­
ern bonds, burst and render those bonds asunder, voiding excrements 
and run to and fro for fear.”44 The Saratthappakasini (vol. 2, p. 285), 
Buddhaghosa’s Commentary, however, contradicts the passage declaring 
that “lions which are similar [in nature and power] (sama-siha),45 elephants
41 Juvenile play has long been known to perform a paramount role in helping young ani­
mals to learn and practise foraging patterns as well as social behaviours. Ethologists have 
postulated a series of theories concerning why many adult animals keep their playfulness all 
throughout their lives in spite of the fact that it could often be costly in terms of energy 
invested and relatively unprofitable as far as the acquirement of new adaptive gains goes. It 
seems that no perfectly plausible theory has been found yet (see Sarah L. Hall, “Object play 
by adult animals,” in Mark Beckoff and John A. Byers, eds., Animal Play: Evolutionary, 
Comparative, and Ecological Perspectives [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998], esp. 
47-48; also 56-57).
42 The passage goes on describing that young elephants imitate this adult behaviour, but 
they do not wash the lotus fibres and stalks well and eat them with mud. This results in their 
death. I cannot understand exactly why this happens. Could it be because eating (that certain 
type of) mud is harmful to elephants? The text is more concerned with drawing the conclu­
sion that Devadatta, like the young elephants, will die trying to imitate the Buddha. The lotus 
roots as a favourite food for elephants also occurs in Cp 84.
43 Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 996.
44 F. L. Woodward, trans., The Book o f the Kindred Sayings, Part 3 (London: PTS, 1925), 
70-71.
45 Woodward (The Book o f the Kindred Sayings, Part 3, pp. 70-71, n. 1) translates “lions 
of like nature,” which aptly reflects Buddhaghosa’s ambivalence. Does sama refer here to 
lions belonging to the same species? Or does it mean male lions of equal power? The 
Commentary seems to encompass both shades of meaning, but it is more likely that it refers 
to a male lion. It says, “the so-called ‘similar lion’ is not frightened because it thinks ‘I am
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of good breed (hatthajamyaf, thoroughbred horses (assajdniya), bulls of 
good breed (usabhajanlya), and men of noble breed [i.e. arahants] whose 
minds are free from contaminations (purisajamya khindsava)”46 do not fear 
the lion’s roar. It then adds that elephants, horses, and bulls “are not fright­
ened because of the strength of their belief in the eternity of the self’ 
(hatthajaniyadayo attano sakkayaditthibalavataya na bhayanti).^ Though 
rather free, Woodward’s translation “because they trust in self and mighty
similar by birth, species, family, courage, and nature’ (sama-siho nama "jati-gotta-kula- 
sura-bhavehi samano ‘mhi" ti na bhayati)/' The lion thus “thinking” is more likely to be a 
male. It is usual male lions which roar and have the “courage” to fight each other. In etho- 
logical terms, provided that Buddhaghosa was keen on this aspect here, the scene is very 
plausible: the lion’s roar has basically a territorial function (see subsection on the lion) and a 
male lion, confident in its power, would not be frightened by the roar of another male.
46 An English equivalent of asava/asrava able to give account of the whole semantic 
sphere and historic evolution of the term is admittedly quite difficult. Lambert Schmithausen 
(“An Attempt to Estimate the Distance in Time between Asoka and the Buddha in Terms of 
Doctrinal History” in Heinz Bechert, ed., The Dating o f the Historical Buddha/Die Datierung 
des historischen Buddha, Part 2 [Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992], 123-129) who 
develops many of Enomoto Fumio’s findings, gives a brief but very illuminating account of 
the history of the concept. His conclusion can be summed up as follows: in Jainism as(r)avas 
“came to refer, primarily, to karma, or to the influx of karmic substance. In Buddhism, on the 
other hand, the as(r)avas are, to be sure, occasionally understood as, or at least as including, 
karma, but the predominant tendency is to take them as unwholesome mental attitudes or 
states (i.e., to put it in later terminology, as klesasf’ (p. 127). I am indebted to Professor 
Schmithausen who kindly drew my attention to this study and the complicated semantic fate 
of the term, but the responsibility to translate asava/asrava as “contamination” lies with me. 
The English term (cf. Lesley Brown, ed., The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on 
Historical Principles [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993], s.v. “contaminate” and “contamina­
tion”) implies the action of becoming or making impure by contact (cf. the etymon con + tan- 
gere, i.e. “to touch with”) which seems to me to convey both the nuances of “influx” and the 
resulting “polluted state.” Furthermore, if more linguistic speculation is allowed, since a con­
taminated object defiles other things which come in contact with it, “contamination” may 
also be indirectly linked to the metaphor of “outflow,” with which asava/asrava also appears 
associated (cf. Schmithausen, ibid., 124). Finally, as the word “contamination” is bound to 
suggest unpleasant connotations, it can be said to evoke such nuances as “trouble” or “afflic­
tion.” Cf. CPD (s.v. asava/) which contains a long entry with its different meanings and con­
notations as well as its various translations into modem Western languages.
47 I am grateful to Professor Schmithausen who suggests that balavataya should be inter­
preted here as the ablative of the abstract balavata. He also reminded me that the conception 
of animals having a belief in or view of self is not uncommon in Buddhism. “In other pas­
sages of the Yogacarabhumi, we meet with the idea of an innate, spontaneous view of Self 
(sahaja satkayadrstih), considered to occur even in animals and to be morally neutral 
(avyakrta), in contrast to the speculative (pari-ox vi-kalpita/) one which is unwholesome
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power”48 conveys the purport of the Commentary. The belief in the eternity 
of the soul is admittedly a purely human error, but Buddhaghosa most like­
ly uses it with the general sense of self-trust and confidence in one’s power. 
Lions are very strong cats which prey on herbivores as large as giraffes,49 
but as far as I know, it is very unlikely that they would attack a mature ele­
phant. Elizabeth Thomas, speaking about the situation in East Africa and 
Kalahari, stresses that elephants are the only animals to which the lion pays 
due “respect.” She mentions two incidents of aggressive confrontation 
between the two species. In the first one a lion attacked an elephant almost 
in self-defence and was killed by the latter. In the second case a young ele­
phant, aged 16 or 17, was frightened away by the roar of a male lion.50 The 
Commentary is, I believe, right in its description of elephants as very confi­
dent in their power and usually not frightened by the lion’s roar. On the other 
hand, I do not deny completely the possibility of a situation like the one 
depicted in the sutta. Especially if we consider the fact that the royal ele­
phant in question was seriously handicapped by the “stout bonds,” the 
frightening roar of a lion could plausibly make the animal extremely ner­
vous. Generally speaking, I would, nevertheless, favour the interpretation of 
the Commentary and regard the sutta description as a metaphorical image. 
We shall see that Buddhist scriptures tend to exaggerate the strength o f the 
“king of beasts” for doctrinal purposes. In the text quoted above, as in many 
other suttas, the lion’s roar is compared to the Tathagata’s proclamation of 
the Dhamma which frightens the devas. Actually, this is not the only
(akusala) (Lambert Schmithausen, Alayavijnana: On the Origin and the Early Development 
o f a Central Concept o f Yogacara Philosophy [Tokyo: The International Institute for 
Buddhist Studies, 1987], 148; see also note 928 which lists relevant passages from the 
Yogdcdrabhiimi, Abhidharmakosa, Nyayanusara). Is this conception a mere scholastic prod­
uct? Or does it rely on the observation that animals, at least some of them, have the rudiments 
of self-awareness? It is hard to reach a definitive conclusion. Let also us note here that there 
seems to be strong evidence that chimpanzees and orangutans have self-recognition, but the 
existence of consciousness in animals remains debatable (cf. Maier, Comparative Animal 
Behavior, 115-117).
48 Woodward, The Book o f the Kindred Sayings, part 3, p. 70-71, n. 1.
49 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 7, p. 382.
50 Elizabeth M. Thomas, The Tribe o f Tiger (1993); quoted after Japanese translation: 
Nekotachi no kakusareta seikatsu SaT t C b H. Kimura, trans. (Tokyo: Soshi- 
sha, 1996), 213-6. It may be interesting to note here that the tiger, the largest of the Felidae 
family, also avoids attacking elephants as well as healthy large mammals, although there have 
been exceptional cases of tigers reported to have attacked elephants and adult buffaloes (The 
New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 11, p. 767).
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instance when a Buddhist text describes an elephant frightened or attacked 
by a lion. SN II279 asserts that the elephant fears the lion, and AN III 121-2 
mentions that the lion always strikes its blow with utmost care no matter if it 
attacks an elephant, a buffalo, an ox, a leopard, etc. These descriptions are 
also actually employed as similes for the Tathagata’s unsurpassed virtues, 
and they seem to me to represent literary devices, biased as they may be, 
rather than real observations.
3.2. The Deer
The usual Pali words denoting what is commonly translated as “deer” are 
miga, maga, and roruva.5  ^Miga and maga raise some delicate philological 
problems. According to the PTS Dictionary (s.v.miga), miga means “wild 
animal” when characterised by another attribute and “deer, antelope, 
gazelle” when uncharacterised. Maga is described by both the PTS 
Dictionary and Mizuno51 2 as a lexical variant of miga. Geiger considers that 
both miga and maga are derived from mrga but understands maga as “ani­
mal” and mz'gzz as “gazelle,” though he adds in a footnote (n.2) that the lat­
ter can also be found with the general meaning of “animal.”53 The most 
detailed discussion of the two terms is found in a study by Hermann Berger 
who also derives both terms from mrga.54 He traces the cause of the differ­
entiation between maga meaning “animal” and miga signifying “gazelle” to 
the influence of the feminine ending-z". The German scholar believes that 
this semantic differentiation resulted from the fact that “mrga in the sense of 
‘animal’ could never form a fem[inine], while in the case of its meaning of 
‘gazelle,’ the (well attested) fem[inine] migi<mrgi influenced the 
mascfuline]” (p. 42). When used as independent words, the miga-maga dis­
tinction is very clear, but it tends to blur in compounds. While migavisana 
“gazelle’s horn” or migadhenn “female gazelle” are obviously related to the 
gazelle, compounds like migava “hunting” or migadaya “game park”55 are
51 Roruva is translated by the PTS Dictionary as “a sort of hart.” Mizuno Kogen 7KSF3A7U,
Parigo jiten P — 'J 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1988), s.v. roruva, renders it as
—®, Eg or “a sort of deer, deer.”
52 Mizuno Kogen, Parigo jiten, s.v. maga.
53 Wilhelm Geiger, Pali Literature and Language, 67.
54 Hermann Berger, Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre (Miinchen: Kitzinger, 
1955), 40-42. I am indebted to Professor Schmithausen who has drawn my attention to this 
study.
55 The German equivalent given by Berger is “Wildpark,” which translates both as “game
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difficult to interpret as referring to animals in general or deer in particular. 
Furthermore, a compound like migaraja “king of beasts” (see below) 
undoubtedly refers to animals in general.56
In one of the earliest traditional glosses of the term, the Cullaniddesa 
explains miga as consisting of two species: dve miga: eni-migo ca sarabha- 
migo ca (p. 227, Explanatory Matter, No. 509). Eni is understood by the 
PTS Dictionary (s.v. miga), as denoting an “antelope,” and sarabha as des­
ignating a “red deer.”57 CPD translates eni (s.v.) and em-miga (s.v.) as “the 
black antelope.” “Antelope” may be a convenient word for a number 
species covered by miga, but it is doubtful whether it is appropriate for the 
whole range of them. Strictly speaking, “the term antelope has no precise 
zoological definition,”58 being a general word for a large number of herbi­
vores belonging to the family Bovidae. The Abhidhanappadipikd lists the 
following words under the miga entry:
The yak, the spotted-deer,59 the /cwradga-deer60 are miga species;
The rum-deer,61 the rawAru-deer,62 the w/h/m-deer,63 the red deer, 
park” and “deer park.” Berger says, however, that the available data does not allow to deter­
mine whether the denizens of such parks were deer only or other animals as well (p. 42).
56 In Shastri’s glossary of the Pali terms in the Abhidhanappadipikd both words are 
given the Sanskrit equivalent of mrga. Maga is translated into Hindi as harin or “a deer, 
an antelope” (p. 78, s.v. maga). Miga is rendered as (1) harm, and (2) simh adi caupaye or 
“quadrupeds including the lion, and so on” (p. 82, s.v. miga'). (For the Hindi equivalents, I 
have relied upon R.S. McGregor, ed., The Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993]).
57 S.v. eni the translation is “a kind of antelope,” and s.v. sarabha it is “a sort of deer,” with 
the addition of the Pali gloss rohita sarabhamiga.
58 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 1, p. 441.
59 The PTS Dictionary translates it as “spotted antelope.”
60 The PTS Dictionary renders the term as “a kind of antelope.”
61 The PTS Dictionary gives the word as ruru, which it translates as “a sort of deer, a stag.” 
The term also occurs in Ja VI 277. E.B. Cowell and W.H.D. Rouse, trans., The Jataka or 
Stories o f the Buddha's Former Births (Oxford: PTS, 1995; orig. publ. 1895),vol. 6, p. 135, 
translate it as “rurus.” Nanden, vol. 38, p. 450, similarly employs a phonetic transcription )b 
DS, or “ruru-deer.”
62 As far as I know, the term is not attested in Pali. We find it, however, in Sanskrit, and 
Monier-Williams translates it as “a species of deer or antelope.” (A Sanskrit-English 
Dictionary [Tokyo: Meicho Fukyukai Co., Ltd., 1986; orig. publ. 1899]). On the Sanskrit 
sources and Moggallana’s Sanskrit re-constructions in the Abhidanappadlpika, see Geiger, 
Pali Literature and Language, 56.
63 Ninka also occurs at Ja VI 277. Cowell and Rouse, trans., The Jataka or Stories of the
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and so on are included in the [word] miga. 
camaro pasado ceva kurango migamatuka! 
ruru rahku ca ninko ca sarabhadi migantara/I 619 II (Shastri ed., 
P- H l)
We must add to this terminological wealth the word kadaltmiga translated 
by the CPD as “the kadali deer; a kind of deer (or antelope?)’ and by the PTS 
Dictionary as “a kind of deer, antelope.”64
As with many other traditional animal names in classical writings a pre­
cise identification is very difficult. Zoologically, we are hampered by the 
lack of accurate descriptions as well as by the sad reality that some of these 
species may have become extinct. Linguistically, we have to acknowledge 
the fact that many of these terms could cover several species often stretching 
over different families. What we usually call “deer” represents the family 
Cervidae which contains 17 genera and 41 species.65 The most likely candi­
dates from the Cervidae covered by the term miga are the muntjacs or bark­
ing deer (Muntiacus muntjak), the chital or spotted deer (Axis axis'), the hog 
deer (Axis porcinus), the chambal (Cervus unicolor), and the barashinga 
(Cervus duvaucelli), the last two representing Indian species of red deer. The 
gazelle, on the other hand, belongs to the family Bovidae and forms a genus 
in itself, i.e. Gazella, which has 3 subgenera and 16 species.66 Within this 
genus the Gazella bennettii is spread in Pakistan and India67 and it could 
have been covered by one or more of the Pali words listed above. It seems 
safe to suppose that miga was a generic term which encompassed species
Buddha's Former Births, vol. 6, p. 135, translate it as “nirhkas.” Nanden, vol. 38, p. 450, ren­
ders it as — or “ninka-deer.”
64 Cowell and Rouse (in The Jataka or Stories o f the Buddha's Former Births, vol. 6, p.
135) translate it as “spotted kadall-deer.” “Spotted” apparently stands for bahucitra. Nanden, 
vol. 38, p. 450, also makes use of a phonetic transcription A  'J — g  or “kadari-deer,” but it 
understands bahucitra as or “manifold beautiful.” I tend to believe that
Cowell’s and Rouse’s interpretation is better, but I must confess that I have not checked other 
occurrences of the term in the Canon as well as the view of the commentarial tradition on this 
passage.
65 Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f  the World, 109 Iff.
66 Ibid., 1199.
67 As many other species of gazelles, Gazella bennettii has been adversely affected by 
excessive hunting, grazing, and agriculture development. There remain only 10,000 individ­
uals of this species in India, Pakistan, and southern Iran living in protected areas (Nowak, 
Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 1201).
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from both the Cervidae and Bovidae, the latter most probably represented by 
the gazelle. It is not excluded that in some cases, if the Abhidhanappadipika 
definition is correct, miga could have also included the yak. As for the 
English translation, I can only say that both “deer” and “gazelle” appear 
equally appropriate from a linguistic and zoological point of view. For sim­
plicity’s sake, I shall use here only “deer.”
The gentle character of the deer makes it a positive image, mainly associ­
ated with the ascetic. Ud 19 says that the recluse dwells in the forest free of 
fear and anxiety, “with the heart as that of a deer”(/mga£Autena cetasa.) 
We find the same image at MN I 450 and Vin II 184. Homer translates 
migabhutena cetasa in these passages as “[unconcerned, unruffled . . .] with 
the mind become as a wild creature’s.”68 9 The Papancasudani 
Majjhimanikdydtthakatha (part 3, p. 167) glosses migabhutena cetasa viha- 
ranti as “abiding in a state of no expectation” (apaccasimsanapakkhe thita 
hutva viharanti)™ Buddhaghosa then adds the following story. A wounded 
deer will go to a place inhabited by human beings in order to obtain medi­
cine (bhesajja') or ointment (yanatela). It will then return to forest and lie 
down until its wound is cured. The feeling of comfort when it stands up 
completely recovered is the state of no [further] expectation. The story, if 
based on real observation, describes a touching page in the otherwise over­
whelmingly cruel history of the relationship between humans and animals. It 
is not totally impossible that miga refers here to animals in general, but I 
hardly see how a predator, for instance, would go to a village and obtain 
medicine. I rather believe that Buddhaghosa describes the scene with a gen­
tle deer in mind used to (non-violent!) human contacts and able to approach
68 Peter Masefield, trans., The Udana (Oxford: PTS, 1994), 31. Nanden, vol. 23, p. 115 
understands the phrase in the same way: “with a mind like a deer”
69 I.B. Homer, trans., The Book o f Discipline (Oxford: PTS. 1938-1966), part 5, pp. 
258-259, and The Collection o f the Middle Length Sayings, vol. 2, p. 122 respectively. The 
PTS Dictionary (s.v. miga), citing this occurrence, translates it as “(having become) like a 
wild animal.” Berger, Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre, 40-41, also discusses 
this compound and renders it into German as friedlich (“peaceful,” “placid”) or mild (“mild, 
gentle”). He adds that it clearly must refer to a gazelle. Berger also mentions Neumann’s 
German translation of the MN in which migabhutena cetasa is rendered as mild geworden im 
Gemute (“having become gentle in mind or disposition”). “Somehow free but apt,” com­
ments Berger, adding that the PTS Dictionary's, rendering is not correct (p. 41, n. 77). Both 
Nanden. vol. 4, p. 283 (Vin) and vol. 10, p. 259 (MN) understand the compound as “deer’s 
mind.” As I explain later in my paper, I also believe that the translation of “deer’s mind” is 
more appropriate than “animal’s mind.”
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humans without frightening them. We should not, however, place uncondi­
tional trust in the works of the great commentator. He may have made up the 
story for literary purposes, or he may simply be wrong as far as the original 
meaning of the text is concerned. I believe, however, that migabhutena 
cetasa makes more ethological sense when we think of a gentle deer than 
animals in general, which would be vague and not necessarily evoking 
images of peace and calm.
Sn 39 (p. 7) (repeated in Ap I 8) exhorts the recluse to be independent like 
a deer which is not tethered and can go wherever it wishes in the forest for 
pasture. Describing his ascetic practices before Awakening, the Buddha says 
that he avoided all human presence “as a deer in the forest. . . having seen a 
man, flees from grove to grove, from thicket to thicket, from low ground to 
low ground, from high ground to high ground” (MN I 79).70 1 MN I 173-5 
compares the recluses and brahmans addicted to the sense-pleasures with a 
deer caught in a heap of snares. In sharp contrast are those aloof from these 
temptations, intent on the practice the nine successive states of attainment 
(nava anupubbaviharasamapattiya). They are said to be like a deer out of 
the trapper’s reach roaming over the forest confidently. In the Sagathavagga 
the homeless monks are likened to the untrapped deer wandering in freedom 
(SN I 199), and those who practise contemplation will surely attain peace 
(sotthim gamissanti^2 like a deer in marshy lands (kaccha) free of mosqui­
to (SN I 52).
70 CPD translates apaccasimsana as “wishing nothing in return.”
71 I. B. Homer, trans. ,The Collection o f the Middle Length Sayings, vol. 1, p. 106.
72 M. A. Rhys Davids translates “they surely shall in safety go their ways.”(7%e Book o f the
Kindred Sayings [London: PTS, 1917], Part 1, p. 73). I consider sotthim the direct object of 
the verb and interpret it like Nakamura Hajime (Budda kamigami to no taiwa: Sanyutta 
Nikaya f " j d '  flA  t  A y  • —A —"V I [Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1986], vol. 1,
p. 1 2 1 :..A A tt.
73 On the peculiar nature of this sutta, cf. Nakamura Hajime, 1986, vol. 2, 392. Budda
akuma to no taiwa: Sanyutta Nikaya ~ f" j^  • —f t—y  II (Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 1986), vol. 2, p. 392.
This is the most frequent but not the only type of image and behaviour 
associated with the deer. The cautious character of the animal occasionally 
acquires negative nuances. At SN I 210 the recluse annoyed by the gossip of 
the world is compared with a deer which fears even the wind in the forest.73
The Commentary to Th 109 (p. 16) (Paramtthadipam, vol. 1, pp. 
229-231) describes a doe which gives birth to a fawn, and in its strong
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maternal love never goes away far from the young. Unable to eat and drink, 
the doe eventually becomes famished. This short story may impress a lay 
ignorant man like me, but for Thera Sarigharakkhita, who supposedly 
uttered the verse here, it carried a different meaning. The doe looking after 
the fawn at the expense of its own hunger strongly evoked him the image of 
the human suffering caused by attachment. This stimulated him to cultivate 
insight and attain arahantship (vipassanam vaddhetva arahcittam papuni).
3.3. The Monkey
The most frequently used Pali words to refer to the monkey are kapi, 
makkata, semhara, and sakhamiga. It is not clear whether all these terms are 
variant lexemes denoting the same species or they refer to different kinds of 
monkeys. None of the dictionaries I have consulted has been of any help, 
and I am not aware of any relevant traditional commentary which could 
shed light on the question.74 75 The Abhidhanappadlpika gives the following 
list of synonyms: plavamgama, makkata, vdnara, sakhamiga, kapi, 
vallmukha, plavahgaJ5 Judging from the geographical distribution of pri­
mates in India, the most likely candidates are the hanuman langur 
(Semnopithecus entellus) and the rhesus monkey (Macaco mulatto'), but one 
or more species of brow-ridged langurs or leaf monkeys (genus 
Trachyopithecus) may also be covered by the Pali words listed above.
74 Dictionaries are also silent on the differences between the Sanskrit and Buddhist Hybrid 
Sanskrit equivalents kapi and markata. CPD translates kapi (s.v.) simply as “a monkey.”
75 Shastri ed., Abhidhanappadlpika, p. 110, verses 613-614. Plavamgama, vallmukha, and 
plavahga are attested only in Sanskrit. Incidentally, the Hindi translations offered by Shastri 
in the Abhidhanappadlpika and Ekkharakosa are equally vague as far as zoological accuracy 
is concerned. Kapi is translated as bandar, and makkata is rendered as banar. According to 
McGregor, The Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary, s.v., both Hindi words mean “monkey,” 
banar being directly derived from the Sanskrit vdnara and bandar being connected to the 
Sanskrit vanar-, vdnara-. The form bamdara is found as early as the 16th century in the alle­
gorical epic Padmavata written by the Sufi poet Malik Muhammad Jayasi in Earli Awadhi or 
Eastern Hindi (cf. Ramesh Mathur, Padmavata: An Etymological Study (Calcutta-Delhi: 
Simant Publications India, 1974), 127, where bamdara is also derived from vdnara and trans­
lated as “monkey”).
The monkey is the classical symbol of mind agitation in Buddhist litera­
ture. The association between the monkey and this typically human afflic­
tion is more conspicuous than in the elephant’s case. At Th 1111 (p. 99) the 
simile is very clearly stated: “the unsteady mind is like a monkey” (cittam
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calam makkatasannibham). Though wearing robe, a monk of unsteady mind 
is like a monkey in a lion’s hide (Th 1080, p. 96). The recluses and brahmans 
who keep on going from one teacher and doctrine to another (admittedly, 
another form of agitation) are compared to monkeys which travel by grab­
bing one branch after another (Sn 791, p. 155; commented upon in the 
Mahaniddesa, pp. 91-2).76 The mind is depicted as a monkey locked in a lit­
tle hut. Prowling “round and round from door to door he [i.e. the monkey] 
hies, rattling with blows again, again” (Th 125-6, p. 18).77 All animals, 
including Homo sapiens, when confined in an unfamiliar place, are bound to 
be stressed and signal their unresolved motivational conflicts by various dis­
plays.78 The problem here is not one of mere observation. The passages use 
these unbiased observations to build a biased association of the monkey with 
the unsteady human mind. I have not been able to find anything that would 
scientifically prove that primates are particularly agitated animals, though 
the fight for supremacy and aggressiveness of the chimpanzee dimly remind 
of its more “advanced” relative, i.e. the Homo sapiens. It is perhaps the 
highly social life of the monkeys requiring complex intra-group activities as 
well as the great amount of primate curiosity and playfulness,79 behaviours 
usually linked with intelligence, that paradoxically make them the most suit-
76 Except for a few species living on the ground, most primates prefer arboreal locomotion. 
Our passage, which uses kapi here, apparently points to an arboreal monkey, but this does not 
help us much in determining what species it actually refers to. The “candidates” listed in the 
main text, though containing species adapted to a wide variety of habitats and with some pop­
ulations of Hanuman langur spending most time on the ground (Nowak, Walker’s Mammals 
o f the World, 600), have all good arboreal capability (ibid., 582, 600, 602).
77 Rhys Davids trans., The Psalms o f the Brethren (Oxford: PTS, 1913), 112.
78 Cf. Aubrey Manning and Marian Stamp Dawkins, An Introduction to Animal Behaviour, 
5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), 244-6. The hut confinement is, strictly 
speaking, a disruption of normal behaviour. Incidentally, the stress it could generate could 
have serious effect on the animal welfare (ibid., 246-254). We might be relieved to know that 
it is very unlikely that Buddhist ascetics were carrying such experiments to corroborate their 
literary productions. Monks and nuns (when they care about observing the Vinayal) are not 
permitted to keep animals (cf. McDermott, “Animals and Humans in Early Buddhism,” 277).
79 For primate ethology, see Russell L. Ciochon and Richard A. Nisbett, eds., The Primate 
Anthology: Essays on Primate Behaviour, Ecology, and Conservation from Natural History 
(Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1998); Richard Byrne, The Thinking Ape: Evolutionary 
Origins o f  Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995); and Maxeen Biben, “Squirrel 
monkey play fighting: making the case for a cognitive training function for play,” in Bekoff 
and Byers, Animal Play, 161-182.
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able candidates for impersonating the “jigging” mind of their human 
cousins.
3.4. The Lion
The lion (Panthera leo),80 “a solar symbol of overpowering brightness”81 
inspiring human respect in all cultures and ages, is a pan-Buddhist zoeme 
standing for the highest qualities, most often linked with the Lord himself. 
The Tipitaka authors show considerable familiarity with the lion. This 
should come as no surprise: unlike modem India, the lion in ancient times 
was not a rare curiosity confined to national parks.82 The “king of beasts” 
was found in historical times from the Balkan and Arabian peninsulas to 
central India and almost all throughout Africa.83 84 The lion in our texts 
undoubtedly refers to the Asian subspecies of lion (Panthera leo persica).
80 Depending on the classification, the lion is treated as a genus of its own in which case it 
is called Leo leo (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 1994, vol. 7, p. 383). I have adopted 
here Nowak’s classification which considers it a subgenus of Panthera (Walker’s Mammals 
of the World, 821). The modem lion in India is considered a subspecies whose scientific name 
is Panthera leo persica.
81 Jean Chevalier and Alain Gheerbrant, A Dictionary o f Symbols, J. Buchanan-Brown 
trans. (London: Penguin Books, 1996; orig. publ. in French 1982), 611.
82 By 1940 the lion had been eliminated in Asia with the exception of the Gir forest in 
Gujarat where its population has recently reached about 250 individuals after vigorous con­
servation efforts (Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 834).
83 Ibid., 821.
84 The Tikd (Samyuttanikaye Khandhavaggatika, Sihasuttavannana, quoted according to 
the Chattha Sahgayana CD-ROM, Version 1.1 [Dhammagiri: Vipassana Research Institute]) 
states that there are four kinds of lions according to characteristics of colour, features, etc. 
(vannavisesadisiddhena visesena cattaro siha). It then says that the Commentary, after hav­
ing indicated these categories from the viewpoint of colour and food, explains the various 
types of lions, (te idani namato vannato aharato dassetva iddhadhippetasiham 
nanappakarato vibhavetum).
Basically, its accurate identification seems to pose no special problems, 
but the Pali commentarial literature confronts us with a puzzling classifica­
tion. In the Saratthappakasini (vol. 2, p. 283), Buddhaghosa lists four types 
of lions: the grass-lion (tina-siha), the black-lion (kala-slha), the yellow­
lion (pandu-stha), and the maned-lion (kesara-siha)8  ^ The last two types 
may simply refer to the female lion and male lion respectively. 
Buddhaghosa does not state it clearly and seems more preoccupied with the 
description of the outward appearance, which is very detailed especially for
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the “maned-lion.” The exact identification of the first two categories 
remains a mystery for me. Let us first quote the Cowjtewtarp itself: “And 
amongst these [four types], the grass-lion is a grass-eater similar to a dove­
coloured cow. The black-lion is a grass-eater similar to a black-coloured 
cow” (Tesu tina-siho kapota-vanna-gavi-sadiso tina-bhakkho ca hoti. Kala- 
siho kala-gavl-sadiso tina-bhakkho yeva). These two types are contrasted 
with the “yellow-lion” which is defined as “a meat-eater similar to a cow of 
the colour of yellow leaves” (pandu-siho pandu-palasa-vanna-gavi-sadiso 
mamsa-bhakkho). No matter how startling it may be for us, Buddhaghosa 
does appear to mean that he has in mind two kinds of literally “grass-eating” 
lions. The Tlkd does not seem to be surprised at all, and explains the tina- 
siho as follows: “The ‘grass-lion’ [means] a grass-eating lion, [expressed] 
by the omission of the next word after the first word, like in [the case of 
the compound] ‘vegetable[-eating]-king.’” (tinabhakkho siho “tina-siho” 
purimapade uttarapadalopena yatha “sakapatthivo” ti). The Sub­
Commentary refers here to the sakaparthiva sub-class of karmadhdraya 
compounds which is well-known in Indian grammar.85 “Vegetable-king” 
(sakaparthiva) is construed as a “king who eats or enjoys vegetables” (saka- 
bhojl parthivah). Such compounds can be understood only if we suppose 
that a word following the first one has been omitted. This is exactly what the 
Tika is saying. As to the zoological reality behind the compound, I am at a 
complete loss. As any cat-owner could tell, felines do sometimes engage in 
what appears to be grass eating. To be more precise, they do not eat it in the 
sense cows do, but rather chew at long grasses apparently taking some juice 
from them. Zoologists still puzzle over this “strange” behaviour of the cats, 
but some plausible hypotheses are available. The most likely one is that cats 
need to obtain folic acid which is indispensable for the production of 
haemoglobin and is otherwise unavailable from their meat diet.86 I doubt, 
however, that Buddhaghosa or his predecessors, otherwise admirably fine 
observers of the lion, simply confused the occasional behaviour of the feline 
with a major habit worth mentioning as a fundamental characteristic. This 
becomes even more dubious when we consider the fact that he ascribes it 
only to two categories and not to all lions, let alone the puzzling colours of 
these two classes. It is more plausible that we have to deal here with two 
mythological classes lumped together with two categories of real animals.87
85 Cf. Patanjali’s Mahabhasya on Panini’s Astadhyayi II. 1.69, Varttika 8.
86 Desmond Morris, Illustrated. Catwatching (London: Ebury Press, 1995), 67.
87 In a personal communication Mr Peter Skilling informed me that the grass-eating lion is
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Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any textual evidence to support 
my hypothesis.
The lion (siha) and the lion’s roar (sihanddd)^ are the standard similes 
for the Buddha and his Dharma preaching. At SN III 84-6 and AN II 33-34 
the roar of the lion, king of beasts (migarajari),89 plunges all animals into
amongst the “seven Hiamalayan animals” (Thai, satv himapharr, Pali, *satta himavanta), 
including real animals as well as kinnaras, garulas, etc., which are well represented in the 
Thai art. Ven. Nanuttara, former lecturer at the National Buddhist University of Burma, con­
firmed me that we also find in Burma the belief in the existence of grass-eating lions as a very 
special and rare kind of the animal. I have not been able to find any reference, textual, mytho­
logical or artistic, to grass-eating lions in traditional and modem South Asia. On the other 
hand, Dr Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi tells me that the modem Sinhalese have a proverb to 
the effect that a lion would never fall so low as to eat grass. Generalisations are dangerous, 
especially when made without sufficient data, but if this can be taken to be reflect the gener­
al mentality, then tina-slha plays no (or no more?) role in the popular beliefs of modem Sri 
Lanka.
Dr Sue Hamilton pointed out to me that another possibility is to regard bhakkho as a scrib­
al corruption. This is certainly one of the alternatives which textual criticism must always 
bear in mind, but I could not figure out what the original may have been, especially as it 
should also fit with mamsa. If we have here a text corruption, then it should have occurred 
very early. It was probably there at Buddhaghosa’s time and may thus go back to the old 
Sinhalese commentaries. At any rate, the Sub-Commentary, quoted above, takes the word 
bhakkho for granted and glosses it accordingly.
I should like to thank again Dr Hamilton, Mr Skilling, Ven. Nanuttara, and Dr 
Maithrimurthi for their kind help which has alleviated my initial puzzlement.
88 Let us note here that apart from its basic meaning of “lion’s roar,” the Sanskrit equiva­
lent simhanada is also used in Hindu works like the Mahabharata, etc. with the sense of 
“war-cry” or “confident assertion” (Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. 
siriiha). Cf. also Otto Bothlink and Rudolph Roth, Sanskrit-Worterbuch (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1990; orig. publ. 1855-1875), s.v. simhanada: Schlachtgeschrei, ein zum 
Kampfherausforderndes Geschrei, Ausruf des gesteigerten Selbstvertrauens.
89 The Saratthappakasim (vol. 2, p. 283) explains the compound as the “king of the multi­
tude of animals” (“miga-raja” ti miga-ganassa raja). Migaraja is the most widely used 
expression to refer to the lion’s “kingship,” but we also find compounds like migadhibhu (Sn 
684, p. 133) and, very rarely, miginda. The authors of the PTS Dictionary (s.v. miga) and 
Berger, Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre, 41, quote only one occurrence in the 
Saddhammopayana, a late work belonging to the epistolary genre. Berger considers that 
miginda must be a late term patterned on migaraja and migadhibhu. We actually find migin­
da also employedin the Abhidhanappadlpika (p. 110, ver. 611), which, as already mentioned, 
is a late compilation. On the other hand, the Sanskrit counterpart mrgendra appears to be very 
frequent in Hindu sources (cf. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. mrga), 
some of them relatively early. In the Bhagavad Gita X 30, for instance, Krishna says of him­
self: “and of the beasts I am the king of beasts.” (mrgandm ca mrgendro ‘ham), which is one
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great fear.90 Even so, all devas become frightened when the Tathagata 
expounds the doctrine of impermanence. It 123 declares the Buddha to be 
the supreme lion (eso so bhagava buddho esa siho anuttaro'). Mara asks the 
Lord why he roars like a lion full of confidence before his audience (SN I 
110). Two discourses in the Majjhima Nikdya. i.e. the Culasihanada-sutta 
and the Mahasihanada-sutta (MN I, suttas no. 11 and 12 respectively), cen­
tre upon the symbolism of the lion’s roar. Though a less heroic image, at SN 
I 16 the Buddha is likened to a solitary lion.91
The symbolism is not restricted to the Buddha only. The most frequent 
candidates to the right of “lionhood” are, however, the adepts who have 
attained or are approaching the summon bonum of the Buddhist Path. 
Having reached arahantship, Thera Bharadvaja utters these verses:
Tis thus th’enlightened lift their triumph-song,
Like lions roaring in the hill-ravine. (Th 177, p. 23)92
Actually, the introductory verses of the Theragatha compare all psalms of 
the holy men with the lion’s roar (Th, p. 1). At Ap I 12 the recluse is exhort­
ed to be like the lion which is not startled by any sound, and subdues all 
beasts with its enormous strength. In Mil 400-1 the physical characteristics 
and habits of the lion become a source of comparisons for the ideal virtues 
of the ascetic striving on the Path (yogin yogdvacara').
of his divine self-manifestations (atmavibhuti). Sankara comments on this: “and of the beasts 
the king of beasts, [i.e.] the lion or the tiger, I am.” (mrganam ca mrgendrah simho vyaghro 
va aham) (Works of Sdnkaracdrya in Original Sanskrit, vol. II: Bhagavadgita with 
Sahkarabhasya [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981; orig. publ. 1929], 156). It is then very 
likely that miginda was a translation of the Sanskrit mrgendra and it started to be employed 
in late Pali texts on a very limited scale. It is interesting to note that the Saddhammopdyana 
might be related to the Abhayagirivihara literature (see von Hiniiber, A Handbook o f Pali 
Literature, 202-3; S. Dietz, Die buddhitsische Briefliteratur Indiens [Wiesbaden: Asiatische 
Forschungen Band 84, 1984], 31-37). It is also important to remember that the 
Abhidhanappadipika often employs Sanskritisations which are not usually attested in the Pali 
Canon.
90 The Saratthappakasini (vol. 2, p. 283), which we have discussed above, actually com­
ments on SN III 84-6. After explaining the four types of lion, Buddhaghosa concludes that 
the lion in the sutta is the “maned-lion” (kesara-slha).
91 The basis of a pride is a group of related females and their young. One adult male lion 
(occasionally two or three males) lives together with the pride until it is driven off by a chal­
lenger or a coalition of other male lions (Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 832-833). 
Male lions can also lead a solitary life.
92 Rhys Davids trans., The Psalms o f the Brethren, 137.
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Occasionally, we find the lion’s image associated even with lay follow­
ers. In the Vimanavatthu pious women are told that if they are obedient to 
their husbands, and kill their anger and greed like a lion killing and devour­
ing little animals, they will surely enjoy rebirth in Heaven (Vv 28).
We also come across fairly minute observations concerning the lion’s 
behaviour. SN III 84, AN II 33, and DN III 23 give an accurate description 
of the lion’s hunting habits. In the evening the lion comes out of its lair, 
rouses itself, surveys the four quarters, roars thrice, and then goes out for 
prey (gocardiya).'1 '’ Although its activity can occur at any time of the day, the 
lion tends to be a crepuscular or nocturnal animal.93 4 Its roar appears to be an 
awesome sound which can be heard by people up to 9 km away. It is usual­
ly given after sunset as well as after a kill and eating, and it seems to per­
form mainly a territorial function.95 Buddhaghosa, commenting upon the 
SN III 84, gives many interesting details about the above habits of the lion. 
I shall discuss here only two of them. Speaking about the lion’s lair (dsaya), 
the Commentary says that the animal comes out of it for four reasons: in 
order to be able to see when it gets too dark; in order to void excrements; in 
order to hunt when hungry; and in order to mate (Saratthappakasim, vol. 2, 
p. 283). Buddhaghosa also gives a detailed description of the way the lion 
rouses itself after awakening (vijambhati).96 97 Firmly standing on its hind 
legs, it stretches its front legs by raising its back and lowering the front part 
of the body—a scene which, I am sure, any cat-lover will easily recognise. 
After rubbing its nose with thunder-like sounds (asani-saddam karonto viya 
nasd-putani pothetva), the lion shakes the dust off its body and rouses itself 
(yijambhati) running to and fro like a young calf (taruna-vacchako viya 
aparaparam javati). And thus its body looks like a firebrand reeling in the 
dark (pan ’ assa sariram andha-kare paribbhamantam alatam viya khayatf) 
(Saratthappakasim, vol. 2, p. 284)9 —a beautiful image evocative of times
93 Cf. note 23 above. For a traditional commentary on the lion’s prey, see Saratthap­
pakasim (vol. 2, pp. 284-5).
94 Nowak, Walker’s Mammals of the World, 832.
95 Ibid., 833. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1994, vol. 7, p. 383) adds that the lion 
also utters its roar before getting up at dawn.
96 According to the PTS Dictionary, vijambhati means “to rouse oneself, to display activi­
ty, often applied to the awakening of a lion.” It also lists the word vijambhika which is ren­
dered as “yawning.” Mizuno, Parigo jiten, s.v., construes vijambhati only as “to yawn.” 
Buddhaghosa’s gloss of this word here makes it clear that, at least in this passage, we have to 
deal with more than the simple act of yawning.
97 I should like to thank Dr Sue Hamilton who has kindly answered some of my questions
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gone by when scenes like this could be witnessed in most parts of the Indian 
sub-continent.
The ascetic subduing the lion, the tiger, or the elephant by his cultivation 
of friendliness (mettabhavana) (see, for instance, Ap I 19, 365; Th 1113, p. 
99) is a very interesting aspect of the relationship between humans and wild 
animals. The modem accounts of forest monks in South and Southeast Asia 
strongly suggest that we have to deal here with more than just a literary ide­
alisation of this Buddhist practice. In a very well-documented study on the 
wandering ascetics in the forests of Thailand during the first half of the 20th 
century, Kamala Tiyavanich reports many cases of thudong (Pali, dhutanga) 
monks who encountered tigers and elephants in the wilderness.98 Not only 
that they survived but despite their (quite understandable!) fear, counterbal­
anced by diligent practice of meditation and/or chanting, tigers did not dis­
play any kind of aggressive behaviour. Unfortunately, scientists have not yet 
discovered a “meita-metre” which would allow an objective measurement 
of friendliness-emanations, and this makes it awfully difficult to verify the 
traditional explanation that metta has a protective function. For the time 
being, we must content ourselves with a more humdrum explanation. I have 
no specific ethological data on the subject, but I venture to surmise that a 
series of closely related factors are essential in this type of human-predator 
encounters. First, even when utterly scared, the ascetic peacefully practising 
his meditation displays no aggressive behaviour against predators. Thus he 
does not trigger a self-defence mechanism in the animals, which would usu­
ally result in the death of the human. Second, the basic survival rule of the 
thudong monks is not to react in any way against strange noises in the for­
est.99 Not reacting in any way also means that they did not run away. The 
decision not to move when finding yourself face to face with a predator is 
paradoxically (but by no means absolutely!) safer than turning your back 
and fleeing away. In most predators, hunting instincts appear to be strongly 
aroused especially when the prey runs away.100 I believe that even Olympic
concerning the wording of the English translation.
98 Kamala Tiyavanich, Forest Recollections: Wandering Monks in Twentieth-century 
Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1997), 79-96. I am grateful to Mr Peter Skilling 
who has kindly brought this book to my attention.
99 Ibid., 102.
100 I remember having seen (and recorded) a TV documentary on cheetahs broadcast by the 
NHK (Japanese National) TV Channel which was quite relevant in this respect.
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champions would hesitate to give it a try if they literally had to face a tiger 
or lion. The latter, for instance, is reported to be able to leap up to 12 metres 
and run for a short distance at 50-60 km/hr.101 Third, despite the existence 
of man-eating tigers and lions,102 man has “never really constituted the 
main diet component for any species.”103 Seen from the lion’s or tiger’s 
“perspective,” humans are not the staple prey but rather an occasional 
“snack.” Even in the latter case, it appears that human encroachment upon 
the predators’ natural habitat is the most important factor which eventually 
causes the appearance of man-eaters.104 A non-aggressive, non-running 
human, like the meditating ascetic, must be a puzzling living being. If not 
attacked by the human, it makes more sense for a healthy tiger or lion with 
an average hunting success to leave the large ape alone and mind its regular 
business. It is hard, if not impossible, to verify whether more mysterious 
forces are at work here, but it seems that the me/ta-based attitude could be
(Unfortunately, I cannot trace it among my video tapes for more reference details . . .) One 
scene shows a cheetah chasing a very young gazelle. When almost caught, the latter displays 
a strange behaviour: it stops and turns round facing its predator. The cheetah is equally puz­
zled but does not kill (or cannot kill?!) its prey which is now standing right in front of it. They 
look at each other for a few seconds and then the young gazelle makes the unfortunate deci­
sion to start running again. This time the cheetah has no hesitation: it catches and kills its prey 
immediately.
101 Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 832. The “feats” a tiger can perform are no 
less surprising. Tigers are reported to be able to leap up to 10 metres (ibid., 825). Like all 
other cats, they can run very fast but only for short distances. Even a cheetah, the feline best 
adapted for chasing the prey, can continue its chase for no more than about 500 metres (ibid., 
835). Compared to the speed of big cats, humans have still a long way to go until they could 
compete with any chance of success. Even a short-distance runner able to cover 100 metres 
in 10 seconds has a speed o f . . .  36 km/hr.
102 Ibid., 827 and 834 respectively.
103 Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist's Study o f the Human Animal (London: 
Vintage, 1994), 152.
104 Between 1969 and 1971 tigers were reported to have killed 129 persons in the Sudarbans 
mangrove forest, at the mouth of the Ganges River. However, only 1% of the tigers actually 
appeared to seek out human beings for prey (Nowak, Walker's Mammals o f the World, 827). 
According to The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (vol. 11, p. 767), “an old or disabled tiger 
or a tigress with cubs may find human beings an easier prey and become a man-eater.” This 
clearly shows that humans (ascetics or not) are not the main biological prey for a healthy 
tiger. From a purely ethological viewpoint, most of the healthy tigers which lived in jungles 
teeming with wild life, as the Thai forests in the first half of this century presumably used to 
be, must have found the strange human ape roaming about its territory at the bottom o f their 
“menu.”
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an efficient protective behaviour ethologically explicable. I must, however, 
admit that the basic requirement of scientific honesty obliges me to make an 
important addition. The monks for whom the ethological “rule” hypothe­
sised here did not work obviously did not survive to tell us the other side of 
the story . . ,105
3.5. The Jackal
At the opposite pole of the positive symbolism of the lion stands the jack­
al.106 In many ways, their antithetical relation reminds us of the traditional 
Western and, to a certain extent, African view of the noble king of beasts 
contrasted with the “abject and silly” hyena.107 The usual image of the
105 Occasionally thudong monks would come across a heap of bones, an alms bowl, and 
scattered monastic robes. It is impossible to know for sure whether these unlucky ascetics 
died of natural causes or as the result of an attack by a wild animal (Tiyavanich, Forest 
Recollections, 95).
106 The Hindu tradition also has a negative image of the jackal which is seen as a symbol of 
greed and cruelty. Anubis, the funerary god of Egypt, was usually depicted with a jackal 
head, though it seems more likely that the “jackals” in Ancient Egypt actually represent “rov­
ing dogs” (Chevalier and Gheerbrant, A Dictionary o f Symbols, 548). Humankind seems to 
share an exaggerated contempt for the scavenging and a strong tendency to see it associated 
with some animals more often than it actually happens. As explained in the text of the paper, 
the jackal does not eat only carrion. It is an equally good hunter. Hyena is, believe it or not, a 
better hunter than the lion, and recent research shows that the king of beasts scavenges more 
often on hyena kills than the other way round (Stephan E. Glickman, “The Spotted Hyena 
from Aristotle to the Lion King: Reputation is Everything” in Mack, Humans and Other 
Animals, 93).
To borrow Glickman’s words, “from a biologist’s perspective, scavenging is an extremely 
honoroble, essential profession” (ibid., p. 93). Though the extent of scavenging vs hunting as 
well as the nature of scavenging (primary or marginal) remains a matter of debate in the sci­
entific community, there is little doubt that Homo habilis (the earliest Homo) and the “Early 
Humans” (the best known of which are Homo erectus and the Neanderthals) did engage in 
scavenging for millions of years (Steven Mithen, The Prehistory o f the Mind: A Search fo r  
the Origins o f Art, Religion, and Science [London: Phoenix, 1998], esp. 112-114, 141; and n. 
15, pp. 276-277, for the debate mentioned above; cf. also Roger Lewin, Human Evolution: 
An Illustrated Introduction, 4th ed. [Massachusetts: Blackwell Science, 1999], 149-154). 
The despise of scavenging must be a recent evolutionary development, which was further 
exacerbated by the biologically comfortable position of a (relatively) constant supply of food 
brought about by the agricultural revolution.
107 These unflattering attributes come from the English translation of Leo Africanus’ 
History and Description o f  Africa, originally written in Arabic by the middle of the 16th cen­
tury ( quoted after Glickman, “The Spotted Hyena from Aristotle to the Lion King,” 105).
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hyena (taraccha, which must be the striped hyena or Hyaena hyaena) in the 
Tipitaka seems to be that o f a wild dangerous animal. It is most often listed 
together with lions, tigers, leopards, and bears, and has no strong connota­
tions of the disgusting and shrewd creature we are familiar with (Vin I 220; 
Vin III 58, 151; AN III 101; Ap I 17, 271; Ja V 406, 416; Ja VI 277, 562; 
Vism 645).
The jackal, on the other hand, fills in the role of “the vilest of beasts” 
(migadhamd, Ja VI452). There are quite a few Pali words denoting this ani­
mal: sigala (v.l. singala), kotthu (v.l. kotthu), jambuka, bherandaka, and 
szva.108 Most likely, they all refer to the golden jackal (Cams aureus), which 
is the only jackal species living in Asia.109 From a purely biological stand­
point, there is nothing which would entitle humans to bash the jackal. As 
with many other carnivores, relations between people and the golden jackal 
are controversial. In Bangladesh, for instance, the golden jackal plays an 
important role in scavenging animal carrion around human habitats and in 
preventing the increase of rodents and hares. But it also raids crops o f com, 
sugar cane, and water melons. It may be involved in the spread o f rabies, 
and in 1979 jackals were reported to have killed two young children.110 It is 
hard to say whether such negative (speaking from an anthropocentric per-
108 The Abhidhanappadipika (p. 110, ver. 615) lists all these synonyms but has bheranda
instead of bherandaka, which is the form usually employed in the Pali Canon (see Ja V 270; 
AN I 187,188). Bheranda appears to be borrowed from the Sanskrit bheranda or bherunda. 
The form bherundaka is attested in Buddhist Sanskrit texts. We find it, for instance, in the 
Saddharmapundarika (K. Kern and Nanjio Bunyiu, ed. [Osnabriick: Biblio Verlag, 1970; 
orig. publ. 1908-1912], p. 85, ver. 60). Kumarajiva translates it as TFF (T9.14a27), which is 
usually defined in Classical Chinese as “a sort of fox,” but appears in Buddhist translations 
as the standard rendering of “jackal.” The Fan y i m ingyiji ffllf (T54.1089a) gives the 
term as the Chinese translation of the xi-qie-luo (Late Mediaeval pronunciation /*sit-khia- 
la/) SIM S, which is a phonetic transcription of the Sanskrit srgala/srgala. Things are more 
complicated with the Mahavyutpatti (Sakaki Ryosaburo ed. [Kyoto: Kyoto
Teikoku Daigaku, 1916], p. 3 19), which translates srgala/srgala into Tibetan as Ice spyang or 
ce-spyang (“jackal” or “fox”) and into Chinese as SfT  (“jackal”). Bherundaka, on the other 
hand, is rendered into Tibetan as spyang (“w olf’) or ce spyang (“jackal” or “fox”) and into 
Chinese as (“w olf’). It is difficult to know the actual situation with certainty, but it appears 
to me unlikely that the Tibetan and Chinese translators had first-hand knowledge of the 
Indian species they were supposed to render into their own languages. If we are to judge from 
the Tibetan equivalents, however, then it would seem that bherundaka was used in a rather 
loose way to refer to both “jackal” and “wolf.”
109 Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 656.
110 Ibid., 659.
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spective) aspects of the human-jackal relation played a part in the Buddhist 
attitude towards animal.111 My feeling is that the texts which we shall dis­
cuss below do not seem to reflect them directly. It is more likely that we 
have to deal here with a folk-image based on the fact that Cams aureus is a 
smaller predator, and it can easily lend itself for an antithetical role to the 
lion. Though there is no doubt that it scavenges, the jackal is also a very able 
hunter.112 It is true that jackals may follow lions or other big cats in order to 
scavenge food, but when they hunt in packs they are able to bring down even 
antelopes and sheep.113 And quite unseemly for “a vile animal,” jackals 
form monogamous stable pairs.114 It is hard to know whether the Buddhist 
authors and redactors were actually aware of the full range of behavioural 
patterns of the jackal. Despite some rare objective descriptions, the texts 
seem more intent to make full use of the folk-image. Let us now look at 
some examples of “jackal-bashing.”
111 We must, however, add that words like bheranda, or bherandaka (cf. bherava, i.e. 
“frightful” or “terror”) do betray clear feelings of fear for the jackal. Professor 
Schmitahausen has kindly drawn my attention to Wackemagel and Debrunner, Altindische 
Grammatik II 2, p. 550 (suffix-wrfa) where bherunda is given as grauenerregend or “terrible, 
atrocious, gruesome.”
112 Nowak, Walker’s Mammals o f the World, 658.
113 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 6, p. 454.
114 Nowak, Walker's Mammals o f the World, 658-9.
115 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 6, p. 454. Britannica describes, however, the 
howl of the jackal “more dismaying to human ears than that of the hyena” (ibid.).
116 The function of howling in wolves, with which jackals have extremely close biological 
affinities, is to bring packs together and mark the territory (Nowak, Walker's Mammals o f the 
World, 667).
117 Geiger (Pali Literature and Language, 149, section 111) discusses this occurrence and
In the Sagathavagga (SN I 66) we are told that in spite of its howl, the 
jackal is a wretched (chava) beast never equal to the lion. We must be 
reminded, by the way, that howling is a very normal crepuscular behaviour 
of the genus Canis.115 It usually serves to communicate between the pack 
members and also has a territorial function.116 DN III 23-26 contains the 
parable of an old jackal which tries to imitate the lion’s roar only to achieve 
ridiculous effects. The following verses present the jackal mainly as a scav­
enger able to hunt only frogs and mice. All the three stanzas in this passage 
end with the same rhetorical question: “Now what is a wretched jackal[’s 
howl] compared with a lion’s roar?” (Are ca chave sigale, ke pana 
sihanade).117 The simile is used, of course, to compare the Lord with the lion
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and a naked (acelcf) ascetic with the old jackal. A similar image is found at 
AN I 187-8 and the Mahaniddesa (p. 177), commenting upon the Pasura- 
sutta, says that an old jackal could never keep up with the king of beasts.
Ja VI 452 calls the jackal “the vilest of beasts” (migadhama), repeating 
the attribute twice, for no specific reason other than their foraging habits: at 
night time jackals supposedly mistake the flowers of the Judas trees118 with 
lumps of meat and at dawn are disappointed to discover flowers instead. I 
doubt the truthfulness of the interpretation given here to this type of behav­
iour, if based on any real observation at all. It is hard to believe that an ani­
mal with an enormously acute sense of smell could make such a mistake.119 
I have no data to substantiate my conjecture, but it is not impossible to see 
here a real foraging activity. Since the jackal’s diet includes fruit,120 the 
Judas tree flowers or, more likely, fruit may form part of their food. 
Whatever this behaviour may be, it is sure that it has nothing in it which 
would justify the epithet “the vilest of beasts.”
The jackal is also a regular name in the list of animals scavenging corpses 
in the charnel field (MN 158; SN V 370; AN III 324; Sn 201, p. 34). We also 
find it present in Hell devouring the evil-doers (Sn 675, p. 131). At SN IV 
177-9 we read how a jackal fails to eat a tortoise which withdraws its limbs 
into the shell. The observation, with all its minute details, is very accurate, 
but the unflattering point (for the animal!) is that the jackal is likened to 
Mara who unceasingly tries to catch the eyes, tongue, or mind of the monks. 
The ideal recluse must be like the tortoise withdrawing its limbs and care­
fully watching over its faculties.
considers that ke for ko (sg.nom.masc.) is a “Magadhesque” form.
118 The flowers of the Judas tree likened to lumps meat seem to be a fairly common image 
(cf. SN IV 193; Ja II 265).
119 I have no data on Canis aureus but canids are known to have an acute sense of smell 
(Nowak, Walker's Mammals o f the World, 635). The dog, which belongs to the same genus 
with the jackal, is, of course, famous for its excellent odour detection capability. Authorities 
estimate it to be between one hundred and one hundred million (!) times better than that of 
humans (Desmond Morris, Dog Watching [New York: Three Rivers Press, 1986], 73). 
Coyotes, another species of genus Canns, seem to have also very well-developed taste-sensi­
tive qualities and excellent learning capabilities. Maier (Comparative Animal Behavior, 80) 
reports that “in some parts of the western United States, where coyotes sometimes prey on 
lambs, a carcass of a sheep laced with a poison may be left out in the area visited by coyotes. 
After a small bite, the coyotes tend to avoid lambs and concentrate on their natural prey.”
120 Nowak, Walker's Mammals of the World, 658.
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I shall conclude with two passages presenting a rather different image of 
the jackal. At MN I 334 a jackal (kotthu) intent on catching fish is described 
as if deeply absorbed in meditation. The text uses a series of verbs arranged 
according to the Waxing Syllable Principle: jhdyati pajjhayati mjjhayati 
apajjhayati.n x  The jackal, alongside some other animals depicted in a simi­
lar way, serves as an image of monks absorbed in contemplation. But even 
here it is not clear whether the simile is absolutely innocent. It is Mara who 
employs these similes in order to convince brahmans and householders that 
monks meditating in such a way will be reborn in Hell after death. His plan 
does not succeed, however, because the monks follow the Lord’s advice to 
practise the four brahmaviharas. The Mahaniddesa (pp. 149-50),12 22 com­
menting upon the Tissametteyya-sutta, contains a similar fragment, but this 
time the image serves to describe the way a poor and simple-minded man 
tries to ponder over a matter. Again, this can hardly be considered a positive 
image.
121 See Mark Allon, Style and Function: A Study o f the Dominant Stylistic Features o f the 
Prose Portions o f Pali Canonical Sutta Texts and Mnemonic Function (Tokyo: The 
International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1997), 19Iff. I am grateful to Dr Allon who con­
firmed to me that even rather irregular sequences of waxing syllables, like the one quoted 
here, i.e. 3 + 4 + 4 + 5 pattern, can be considered instances of the Waxing Syllable Principle. 
Though given different or slightly different names, the principle has been identified and dis­
cussed by a number of Indologists like G. von Simson, J. Gonda, H. Smith, O. von Hiniiber, 
etc. A brief history of the research is found in Allon, Style and Function, 191-193. For the 
more general problem of synonyms in Pali literature and Indian grammar, see M. G. 
Dhadphale, Synonymic Collocations in the Tipitaka: A Study (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental 
Research Institute, 1980).
122 The PTS text gives the sequence as jhayati pajjhayati mjjhayati avajjhayati but notes 
that the Phayre Ms and the Singhalese Ms read the last verb as apajjhayati. I am again indebt­
ed to Dr Allon who pointed out to me, referring to the CPD, that the spelling avajjhayati is 
typical of the Commentaries. CPD restricts its usage of the term “commentaries” to the 
atthakatha class (cf. vol. I, p. XVIII). It is true that the Nidessa is essentially a commentary 
in spite of the fact that it is included in the Khuddakanikaya, but a very old one having noth­
ing to do with the later commentarial genre. In a personal communication Professor 
Schmithausen suggested that avajjhayati may have crept in here as an attempt to adapt the 
text spelling to the jargon of the later commentaries.
4. Buddhist Spirituality and Animal Observation
What did animals actually mean to Buddhist monks? Obviously, no simple 
and definitive answer is possible but a careful reading of the Canon makes it
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possible for us, one hopes, to formulate a plausible hypothesis. For the dog­
matic author, animals were, first of all, a reminder of the basic Buddhist 
Weltanschauung which regards animal existence as a bad form of reincar­
nation. Though starting from a similar philosophical perspective, the wan­
dering ascetic had to face real animals daily and, ideally, he had to it with a 
metto-filled mind. The Buddhist preacher was subject to both his Buddhist 
doctrinal position and folk-images of animals shared with his lay followers. 
This is obviously a simplification of a much more complex psychological 
and social situation. To start with, I do not imply that we always have to deal 
with a clear-cut division of monastic roles or mentality. One single individ­
ual could have performed more than one role and/or shared a complex 
philosophical outlook on animals covering all or some of the views outlined 
here. Whatever the human reality behind our texts might be, the Tipitaka, 
and the Buddhist literature in general, confronts us with a wealth of nuances 
in its attitudes towards animals: from sympathy and correct observation to 
despise and unfair treatment.
But whatever his perspective may have been, the Buddhist author was not 
a Lorenz or a Tinbergen interested to understand animals in their own terms. 
Could we blame Buddhist authors, living in a totally different epistemic and 
axiological context, for not adopting our modem scientific and philosophi­
cal paradigms? I believe that most readers will cautiously say “no.” You 
may be surprised to find out that in spite of the harsh tone of many o f my 
remarks above, I agree that such a blame would be far-fetched. On the other 
hand, we do have the right to hold views and have feelings towards other 
people’s attitudes, whether contemporary or classic. The fact that our own 
views and feelings are in-formed by the paradigms of our time is not so rel­
evant in this respect. After all, the authors of classical writings were as much 
in-formed by the conventions of their age as we are, and they have no right 
to impose their own philosophy on us either. If a dialogue across cultures 
and ages is to be allowed, we cannot avoid the risk of carrying with us our 
own paradigms. Prudence is necessary but complete silence or feigned 
“objectivity” would be hypocritical. To the extent I am allowed to voice my 
feelings concerning Buddhist texts, I shall simply say that I am disappoint­
ed with the instances of unfair treatment given to animals. It is true that this 
attitude is not universal and we also find moving passages of friendliness 
and sympathy towards animals. It is equally true that literary conventions 
rather than genuine views on animals might have been at work in many 
cases. Yet, as a “romantic” reader hoping to find metta and pahha to be all-
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pervading virtues throughout the Canon, I cannot help feeling that the texts 
do contain quite a few instances in which animals could have been treated in 
a fairer way.
The problem, however, is not merely one of a clash between two epis- 
temic and axiological paradigms. The way animals are treated by Buddhist 
authors creates a problem of consistency within the Buddhist philosophical 
framework itself. For a spiritual path which sets as one of its basic goals “to 
know [the essence of phenomena] as it is in reality” (yathabhutam pajanati 
at DN I 83-4, 162; SN IV 188, 192; SN V 304-5; yathabhutam jandti pas- 
sati at Patis II 62-3), “mis-observation” and misconception concerning ani­
mal behaviour is a potentially serious problem. To be sure, the insight into 
the essence of reality is not concerned with contingent aspects. When our 
texts speak of yathabhutam  they usually, but not exclusively, refer to the 
fundamental Buddhist truths or essence of reality. SN IV 194-5 uses the 
phrase yathabhutam vacanam, or “word of truth,” as a simile for Nibbana 
(yathabhutam vacanan ti kho bhikkhu nibbanassetam adhivacanam, p. 195). 
At DN I 83-4 yathabhutam  modifies the verb pajanati (“to know,” “to 
understand”) 123 in relation to the four Noble Truths ( “idam dukkhan” ti 
yathabhutam pajanati, . . . .) as well as to the contaminations and their ces­
sation ( “ayam asava-niroddho” ti yathabhutam pajanati, . . .). The occur­
rence at DN I 162 refers to the Buddha’s supernatural knowledge of the 
states whence people practising asceticism have come as well as of their des­
tinations after death (tapassinam agatih ca gatih ca cutin ca uppattih ca 
yathabhutam pajdnami). SN IV 188 declares that the knowledge of the aris­
ing and destruction of the states of suffering (dukkhadhamma) as they real­
ly are (yathabhutam) is identical with the true understanding and the 
abandonment of sensual pleasures (kama). At Patis II 62-3 the phrase 
“knowing and seeing as it is in reality” (yathabhutam jandtipassati) is used 
with reference to the sign (nimitta) and occurrence (pavatta) of imperma­
nence (aniccaj, suffering (dukkha), and non-self (anatta).
It is clear that yathabhutam  tends to be used in relation to the basic 
Buddhist truths or what Buddhism believes to pertain to the essence of real­
ity. We do find, nevertheless, instances in which the term is construed as if 
referring to a correct knowledge of the concrete aspects of the inner and 
outer worlds. Chapter Two of the Anuruddhasamyutta (SN V 303-6)
123 The epistemic mode implied here is not one of daily understanding or mere intellectual 
knowledge. The preceding sentence makes it clear that it is an act of knowing presupposing 
a mind which is calm, pure, and so on (samahite citteparisuddhe . . .).
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describes Anuraddha’s spiritual powers obtained through the intense culti­
vation and development of the four applications of mindfulness (catunnam 
satipatthananam bhavitatta bahulikattata). Amongst his numerous achieve­
ments, we find the correct knowledge of the people (or beings) of diverse 
and variegated dispositions (anekadhdtum nanadhatum lokam yathabhutam 
pajanami, SN V 304),124 the various inclinations of the beings (sattanam 
nanadhimuttikam yathabhutam pajanami, SN V SOS),123 and the different 
degrees of development of the faculties of other beings and persons 
(parasattdnam parapuggalanam indriyaparopariyattimn(> yathabhutam 
pajanami, SN V 305).127 One would expect that such an extraordinary
124 I am grateful to Professor Schmithausen who pointed out to me that aneka-dhatum . . . 
lokam should be understood here as “people of diverse dispositions.” One of the CPD equiv­
alent of aneka-dhatu (s.v.) is “with many natural conditions (or dispositions).” The CPD 
quotes here the commentarial explanation: anekajjhayasaya. Let us also note that anekadhatu 
ndnadhdtu . . . loko appears to be a stock phrase. As to loka, its semantic sphere is very broad 
encompassing not only the material and immaterial universe but also the people and living 
beings inhabiting it (cf. PTS Dictionary, s.v. loka). To be sure, the exact sense of dhatu here 
is hard to determine. One of its most frequent meanings in Buddhist texts is that of “realm” 
(cf. kamadhatu, rupadhatu, ariipadhatu), but the text is very emphatic concerning the great 
variety of dhatu. Closer to this sense is dhatu construed as a constituent system of the 
Universe (cf. dasa-sahassi-lokadhatu), but our passage does not make it clear whether such a 
world view is implied here. F. L. Woodward (trans., The Book o f the Kindred Sayings 
[London: PTS, 1930], part 5, p. 270) translates the sentence: “I know the world as it really is, 
in its divers shapes and forms,” which is not completely incorrect but rather too general. I 
think, therefore, that a translation like “people (or beings) of diverse and variegated disposi­
tions,” as suggested by Professor Schmithausen in agreement with one of the lines of inter­
pretation given by the CPD, is closer to the original meaning of the text.
125 The Singhalese Mss used by Leon Feer read here nanadhimitikatam. Whatever reading 
we adopt, the basic meaning would not change. To be sure, the term adhimutti, adhimutta, 
etc. are not easy to translate but in our context nanadhimiti(ka)tam most probably means “of 
different dispositions or inclinations” or, as Woodward (The Book o f the Kindred Saying, part 
5, p. 270) translates, “divers characters.” See also PTS Dictionary, s.v. nanddhimitikata ren­
dered as “diversity of dispositions.”
126 CPD considers indriya-paropariyatti (s.v.) as a wrong reading for or corruption of 
indriyaparopariyatta (s.v.), rendered as “the higher or lower states, the degrees of develop­
ment, of the faculties.” Indriya-paropariyatta is the abstract form of indriya-paropariya 
(s.v.) which is described as a hyperpalism for Eastern Prakrit-v-(cf. paro ’varam). The PTS 
Dictionary translates indriyaparopariyattirh as “what goes on in the minds and intentions of 
others.” Woodward (The Book o f  the Kindred Saying, part 5, p. 270) renders the whole phrase 
as “as the nature of the minds of other beings, other persons.”
127 We must add, however, that the same passages equally contains more “orthodox” occur­
rences ofyathabhutam in reference to cause (thana), spiritual practice (patipada), and jhana.
119
THE EA STER N  B U D D H IST X X X II, 2
knowledge of external realities and internal processes would encompass a 
better understanding of the behaviour of animals. As we have seen above, 
this is not always the case.
But maybe I am requiring too much. Animal behaviour was perhaps such 
a trifling particular detail that it was not even worth including under the 
heading of “diverse forms of the world” or “various dispositions of the 
beings.” After all, Buddhist philosophers seem to have their own under­
standing of what an individual characteristic means. The Visuddhimagga, 
for instance, has the following definition. To understand the specific charac­
teristics (paccattalakkana) of form (rupa) means to see it as having the 
attribute of being vexed (ruppana).m  To understand its general characteris­
tics (samannalakkana) is to view it as impermanent (aniccci), causing suf­
fering (dukkha), and non-self (anatta) (Vism 606-7/Warren ed., 520). 
Understanding animals in their own terms appears to have no relevance 
here. If anything, they are mere cases of the specific characteristic of “vex­
ation” or instantiations of the more general paradigm of impermanence, suf­
fering, and non-self. The validity of such an epistemological model needs an 
examination in itself going much beyond the scope of our present discus­
sion. Even if we, however, accept the model as correct and even if 
yathabhutam referred mainly (or only) to the supreme truths of Buddhism, 
we would still have to face two closely related problems. The first one con­
cerns the degree of validity. A person having attained the highest form of 
truth cum the most profound spiritual tranquillity would supposedly look at 
reality in a neutral and calm way. Then though “impermanent” and “vex­
ing,” animals would require a closer attention and a fairer treatment when a 
statement is made about their behaviour. The second problem regards the 
lack of logical consistency of Buddhist authors in applying their general 
epistemological model. If both a lion and jackal are similar instances of 
“impermanence” and “vexation,” then lavishly praising the former and 
despising the latter as “the vilest of beasts” is a problem not only of fairness 
and neutral observation but also one of coherence within its own doctrinal 
system. Closely related to these problems, we have another aspect. We all
128 Ruppana “molestation,” “vexation,” “trouble” comes from ruppati which means “to be 
vexed,” etc. and has nothing to do etymologically with riipa (cf. PTS Dictionary, s.v.). 
Buddhist thinkers and commentators do, nonetheless, frequently use ruppana/ruppati for 
explaining riipa. It is hard to decide whether this is a case of a mere folk etymology (to be 
more precise, a pre-modem learned etymology) or a paranomasia deliberately used for doc­
trinal purposes.
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know how emphatic Buddhism is on renouncing all attachment to the self 
and denouncing arrogance (mana) as one of the fundamental yokes 
(samyojana) to the cycle of rebirths. Yet in a large number of texts the 
Tathagata does not lose a single occasion to praise his own qualities and 
utter his Dharmic roar at the expense of the “wretched” jackal-like ascetics. 
Buddhist apologists will, most probably, say that this is a skilful means 
(upaya), but, as an admirer of the basic Buddhist stance of condemning 
arrogance, I cannot stop thinking that this means is not only unskilful but 
also unnecessarily unfair to many animals.
Since the basic goal of historical and anthropological studies is to attain a 
balanced and truthful picture of events, over-emphasising the lack of objec­
tivity and consistency would be counter-productive. As Kahil Gibran said in 
Sand and Foam, “an exaggeration is a truth that has lost its temper.” I must 
repeat here that not all Buddhist descriptions of animals are unfair or incor­
rect. Furthermore, we must be reminded again that it is very likely that in 
many cases the usage of animal images, biased as they are, was first and 
foremost a literary device serving doctrinal purposes. Animals (fortunate­
ly!) do not read suttas or listen to sermons. They have no way to know that 
they “star” an incredible number of similes, parables, allegories, etc., which 
are meant to present purely human subjects in a veiled and/or palatable 
fashion. And all these forms of expression can be said to stem from the 
extreme fondness of the human ape for symbolism. It is hard to decide when 
this use for symbolic purposes becomes a matter of abuse. I know that it is 
difficult to corroborate such an “impressionistic” evaluation, but it seems to 
me that even a religion like Buddhism, potentially (and often actually) so 
friendly towards all living beings, has tended to abuse the image of animals. 
And this may have led to the proliferation not only of a biased way of look­
ing at (and maybe even acting towards) animals but also of an arrogant per­
ception of man’s special status in the Universe.129 Last but not least, I
129 I cannot help being reminded here of the dedication written by Ernest P. Walker 
(1891-1969) at the beginning of his classic encyclopaedia which bears his name: “To the 
Mammals, great and small, who contribute so much to the welfare and happiness of man, 
another mammal, but receive so little in return, except blame, abuse, and extermination” 
(Nowak, The Walker's Mammals o f the World). This could be said about all other animals. In 
this respect, Buddhism can take pride in the fact that, at least doctrinally, it has never con­
doned the extermination of any living being. But on the other hand, it should be ashamed of 
the fact that there are quite a few instances in which, for whatever reason that may be, animals 
appear to be abused.
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should add, much to the consolation of the spiritually-minded readers, the 
fact that those texts which appear to belong to the earliest strata of 
Buddhism130 and to the ascetic genre of Buddhist literature are less prone to 
make “mis-observations” and abuse animal images. But this, too, is not an 
absolute rule. Even the Sagathavagga, which seems to contain very early 
texts,131 has passages speaking about the “wretched” jackal which can never 
be compared to the lion (cf. SN I 66, discussed above).
130 A very delicate problem indeed! I consider that, despite the prudence which one should 
always bear in mind in historical matters, Nakamura’s {Indian Buddhism, especially p. 27, 
quoting Ui Hakuju) and von Hiniiber’s {A Handbook o f Pali Literature) basic dating princi­
ples are a reliable starting point. On the principle positions and methodology of dating the 
Buddhist Canon, see also Lambert Schmithausen, “Earliest Buddhism. Preface" (in David 
Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen, eds., Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka 
[Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990], 1-3); “An Attempt to Estimate the Distance in Time between 
Asoka and the Buddha in Terms of Doctrinal History,” 110-113.1 agree with Schmithausen 
that “though fraught with difficulties and pitfalls” (“An Attempt to Estimate the Distance in 
Time between Asoka and the Buddha in Terms of Doctrinal History,” 112), the attempt to 
establish the stratification of the Canon is not impossible and could be achieved by the con­
joined efforts of generations of scholars (pp. 112-113).
131 Cf. Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, 27 and von Hiniiber, A Handbook o f Pali Literature, 
38.
132 In spite of their generally useful coverage of the subject, essays like those written, for 
instance, by Nakamura Hajime {Bukkyo dobutsu sansaku (ASStifelKJK [Tokyo: Tosho sen- 
sho, 1988], 1-2, 9-30) and Lily de Silva (“The Hills Wherein My Soul Delights: Exploring 
the Stories and Teachings” in Batchelor and Brown, Buddhism and Ecology, 23-5) tend to be 
partial and over-emphatic in their praise of the positive Buddhist attitude towards animals.
The recent popularity of environmental ethics has generated a strong 
interest to revisit traditional outlooks on nature and animals. This is a laud­
able effort in itself, but the modem reader is faced with an increasing num­
ber of apologetic studies and essays on the Buddhist attitude towards nature, 
some of them, written by eminent scholars.132 As I have pointed out above, 
Buddhism contains some remarkable attitudes, and I have no intention to 
deny them. In the West the moral dilemma concerning animal rights has 
centred upon the basic criterion which we should choose in this case: ratio­
nality or sentience. Immanuel Kant, whose views are representative of the 
mainstream Western rationality-centred stance, argues that animals are not 
rational and self-conscious and therefore “directly we have no duties 
towards animals, rather our duties towards animals are indirect duties 
towards humanity” (. . . so haben wir gegen Thiere unmittelbahr keine
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Pflichten, /sondern die Pflichten gegen die Thiere sind indirecte Pfilichten 
gegen die M enschheit))33 The latter criterion is adopted by Utilitarians 
who, following Jeremy Bentham, consider that rationality is irrelevant in 
this case. What matters is sentience, i.e. the common susceptibility o f ani­
mals and man to pain and suffering.
Seen from this perspective, Buddhism appears as a case in between, com­
ing somewhat closer, mutatis mutandis, to Utilitarian conclusions. Animals 
are usually seen as inferior and lacking wisdom (panna), the cognitive fac­
ulty which makes the ultimate cessation of suffering possible. Mil 32 says 
that “sheep, goats, oxen, buffaloes, camels, and asses have intelligence 
{manasikara) but no wisdom (panna).” 134 Obviously, we have to deal here 
with utterly different epistemic paradigms, but we could say that in terms of
133 Vorlesungen iiber Moralphilosphie. Moral Mrongovius (in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften 
[Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1979] vol. XXVII. 2,2, p. 1572). This text represents the 
notes of Kant’s lectures in the winter semester of 1782-1783 taken by Christoph Coelestin 
Mrongovius. This is one of the three Mss which were edited in 1924 by P. Menzer under the 
title of Eine Vorlesung Kants iiber Ethik and translated into English as Lectures on Ethics 
(originally translated by Louis Infield in 1930, with many subsequent editions). See also the 
recent translation Lectures on Ethics, Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, eds., Peter Heath, 
trans.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
In the Grundlegung zur Metaphisik der Sitten (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals) 
(in Kant’s Werke [Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911; orig. publ. 1785], vol. IV, p. 428), Kant 
declares that animals have “only a relative value, as means, and are therefore called things” 
(nur einen relativen Werth, als mittel, und heiften daher Sacheri). This is contrasted with 
humans or rational beings (verniinftige Weseri), called persons (Personeri) and considered 
ends in themselves (Zwecke an sick), therefore absolute values.
134 T.W. Rhys Davids renders manasikara as “reasoning” and pahha as “wisdom” (The 
Questions o f King Milinda, in Sacred Books o f the East [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 
Publishers, 1997; orig. publ. 1890], vol. 35, p. 51), a translation also adopted by McDermott 
(“Animals and Humans in Early Buddhism,” p. 278, n. 13). I understand here manasikara as 
intelligence in its broad sense of “global capacity to think rationally, act purposefully, and 
deal effectively with the environment” (Don H. Hockenbury and Sandra E. Hockenbury, 
Psychology, 2nd ed. [New York: Worth Publishers, 2000], 283). These abilities, mainly 
thinking rationally, with reference to animals must not necessarily be understood as func­
tioning along identical lines and at the same level as in the case of humans. It is, nevertheless, 
beyond doubt that many animals are not only able to form object concepts and even abstract 
concepts but they also have great language-learning capacities and quantitative ability 
(Maier, Comparative Animal Behavior, 100-109). More and more evidence also appears to 
support the hypothesis that apes, mainly chimpanzees, have intentionality and planning, self­
recognition, and perhaps rudiments of the theory of mind (ibid., 114-116). For further details 
on manasikara, see Appendix.
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hierarchy of values the Buddhist panna/prajna and the modem idea o f rea­
son, whether theoretical or practical, are supreme cognitive states. As 
proven in so many passages, Buddhism does not consider, however, that the 
animal lack of wisdom is a criterion which fundamentally decides human 
duties towards animals. The fact that we share with them sentience, many 
faculties which could roughly be defined as intelligence, and, last but not 
least, the same cycle of rebirths are sufficient to guarantee them the right to 
live their lives and receive spiritual friendliness. It is a pity that this friendli­
ness has not developed fully into a deeper understanding of animals “as they 
are in reality.” And any account of the Buddhist attitude towards animals 
which ignores these uncomfortable shortcomings will do no justice to 
Buddhism and animals alike. Incompleteness is just another way o f hiding 
the truth and perpetuating old misconceptions about reality.
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Appendix: Intelligence (yoniso manasikara) o f  Animals
The passage in the Milindapanha (Mil 32) quoted above actually qualifies 
manasikara as yoniso manasikara, i.e. “systematic attention,” “thorough
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attention” or “careful attention,” which it presents as different from wisdom 
(panna). The term yoniso manasikara/yoniso manaskara itself raises diffi­
cult problems concerning its exact interpretation. Let us note that its 
Chinese translation is or “attention according to the principle(s)”
and the Tibetan equivalent is tshul bzhin (du) yid  la byed pa  or “attention 
according to the proper method,” “orderly attention.” Its antonym is ayon- 
iso manasikara/ayoniso manaskara (Tib. tshul bzhin m ayin pa yid  la byed 
pa\ Ch. TW1HT;&), i.e. “distracted or disorderly attention.” Buddhist liter­
ature usually refers to it as a positive state of concentration conducting to 
high spiritual attainments. At It 9 it is defined as an act which leads to the 
elimination of the unwholesome and cultivation of the wholesome (yoniso 
bhikkhave bhikkhu manasi karonto akusalam pajahati kusalam bhavetlti). 
The text continues with a gathd which declares yoniso manasikara to be of 
great help (bahupakaro, var. lec. bahukaro) to the practising monks, 
unequalled by other practices indeed, in obtaining the summum bonum of 
the Path (uttamathassa pattiya), which is no other than the cessation of the 
suffering (khayam dukkhassa) (It 10). At Patis II 189 yoniso manasikara 
appears as one of the four conditions (cattaro dhamma), which when 
intensely practised, will lead to the realisation of the four fruits of the Path. 
The same four conditions are said to lead to the attainment of wisdom 
(pahhapatilabha). This implies that “careful attention” is a very important 
state, but it is only one of the steps/practices which aim at the paramount 
spiritual value represented by panna. We also findyoniso manaskara in the 
Northern tradition as well. The Yogacarabhumi, for instance, dedicates a 
whole section to it.135 The eight things in which careful attention associated 
with coarse observation and subtle examination is manifested (yoniso man- 
askdraprayuktanam vitarkavicaranam vastuni', tshul bzhin yid la byed pa 
dang Idan pa ’i rtogpa dang dpyodpa mams kyi dngodpo;
135 Vidhushekara Bhattacharya, ed., The Yogacarabhumi of Acarya Asanga (Calcutta: Univ, 
of Calcutta, 1957), 114-117; Sde dge Tibetan Tripitaka, Bstan Hgyur, Sems Tsam, Vol. 5 
(Tokyo: Sekai seiten kanko kyokai, 1980) Tshi 58b-60b; T30.302c-303b.
136 Bhattacharya ed., p. 114; Tshi 59a; T30.303al-5.
IS]>) include wholesome acts of the alms-giver, of the virtuous man, o f the 
spiritual practioner, etc.136 Although the term is closely connected with spir­
itual cultivation, its semantic sphere appears to be broad enough to allow its 
association with intelligent acts which could even include, as the authors our 
Mil fragment imply, animal cognition.
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The Milindatika (p. 10) comments upon the yoniso manasikara as “[the 
realisation of this] is impermanent, [this is] suffering” by means of [proper] 
methods, ways having the characteristic of recollection, and with attention 
to the supporting basis” (yoniso manasika[a]rena ti aniccam dukkhan ti 
upayena pathena saranalakkhanena drammanapatipadakamanasikdrena). 
Thus the Milindatika seems to suggest that even animals have the capacity 
to perceive impermanence and suffering following some well-established 
cognitive patterns, but they are unable of attaining wisdom in the Buddhist 
sense of the word, i.e. liberating insight into the essence of reality which 
secures freedom from dukkha.
The Milindapanha Atthakatha, a modem traditional sub-commentary, has 
a whole story to explain its point that “not only human beings but also ani­
mals have careful attention” (na kevalahcesa manussabhutanam yeva yoni- 
somanasikaro atthiyW  It narrates how Buddharakkhita, a young parrot 
(suv apo taka) kept in a nunnery, is taught by the superior sister (mahatheri) 
to repeat the word atthi or “stone of a fruit,” presumably a delicacy which he 
would greatly appreciate. One day the parrot is grabbed by a predatory bird 
and has a narrow escape due to the efforts of the novices and sisters who 
throw clods of mud at the raptor. Asked by the superior sister what he 
thought (cintesi) when in the claws of the raptorial bird, Buddharakkhita, 
who in our story is able to converse with humans, says that he only reflect­
ed upon the fact that “a heap of stones/bones, having seized another heap of 
stones/bones, is going away. At any moment it is bound to strew all over” 
(atthipunjo va atthipunjam gahetva gacchati/katarasmim pi thane vip- 
pakirissati).™ As far as I can understand, Buddharakkhita’s answer is based 
on a pun: att/zz means both “stone of a fruit” and “bone” The superior sis­
ter’s initial intention was to supply the parrot with a lexical item whose 
mechanical repetition would bring Buddharakkhita some occasional snacks. 
The parrot is, however, far more intelligent and not only that he understands 
the homonym atthi “bone” but in a moment of serious crisis he is also able 
to engage in a reflection which echoes the Buddhist refrain of universal 
impermanence. At any rate, the mahatherl is rejoiced to hear this and pre-
137 Thaton Mingun Zetawun Sayadaw, alias U. Narada Mahathera, Milindapahha- 
Atthakatha, transcribed and edited by Madhav M. Deshpande (Tokyo: The International 
Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1999), p. 85. I am grateful to Professor Schmithausen for 
drawing my attention to this passage.
138 Ibid., 85.
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diets that in a future life Buddharakkhita will attain the condition necessary 
for the end of his existence (bhavakkhayassa te paccayo bhavissati). 
Interesting as it may be, and even knowing the amazing achievements of 
Alex the parrot,139 the story cannot be taken at face-value by the modem 
reader, and was probably meant to be a parable even in the original 
Theravada milieu. The message remains, however, the same: though not 
sufficiently developed to reach spiritual Awakening, animals are intelligent 
creatures and a fair amount of cognitive capacities, largely overlapping with 
those of the human beings, must be recognized.
139 Cf. Maier, Comaparative Animal Behavior, 107-108; Hockenbury and Hockenbury, 
Psychology, 282-283.
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